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INTRODUCTION
“Back to the sources!” has been a common cry for many human
rights movements over the centuries. The papal revolutionaries of
* Woodruff University Professor, McDonald Distinguished Professor, and Director
of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University. This Article is drawn in
part from JOHN WITTE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 138–70 (2021) and used with permission of
Cambridge University Press, as well as from JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 41–97 (4th ed. 2016) updated in JOHN
WITTE, JR., JOEL A. NICHOLS & RICHARD W. GARNETT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (5th ed. forthcoming 2022) and used with permission of
Oxford University Press. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Nathan
Chapman, Richard Garnett, and Joel Nichols on the draft of this text.
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the twelfth and thirteenth centuries appealed to the Church Fathers
to press their case for “freedom of the church.”1 The fifteenthcentury Renaissance humanists returned to the pristine sources of
ancient Greece and Rome to revive Europe’s flagging “human
spirit.”2 The sixteenth-century Protestant reformers called for a
return to the Bible in arguing for the “Freedom of a Christian.”3
Early modern English jurists turned to their Anglo-Saxon
constitutions, French jurists to their Salic law, and German jurists
to their ancient constitutional charters to ground their revolutions
in the name of human rights and liberties.4 The eighteenth-century
American revolutionaries appealed to the Magna Carta and its
natural law foundations to argue for their “unalienable rights of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”5 The nineteenth-century
abolitionists and suffragists adduced the Bible, natural law, and the
American Declaration of Independence to call for the rights of
slaves, women, and racial minorities.6 Martin Luther King, Jr.
appealed to all these sources and others to ground his call for

1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); RENAISSANCE AND RENEWAL IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY (Robert L.
Benson, Giles Constable & Carol D. Lanham eds., 1982).
2. JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (photo. reprt. 1968) (1924);
ERNST CASSIER, AN ESSAY ON MAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
CULTURE (1944).
3. JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE
LUTHERAN REFORMATION 1 (2002); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW,
RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007) [hereinafter WITTE,
REFORMATION OF RIGHTS].
4. See DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 10 (1990).
5. JAMES MULDOON, JOHN ADAMS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
MEDIEVAL BRITISH EMPIRE (2018); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE
ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: PREVAILING WISDOM (2008); JOHN WITTE,
JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 45–75 (2021).
6. See detailed discussions and sources in John Witte, Jr. & Justin J. Latterell, Between
Martin Luther and Martin Luther King: James Pennington’s Struggle for “Sacred Human Rights”
Against Slavery, 31 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 221–28, 252, 259–68 (2020); Elizabeth Battelle
Clark, The Politics of God and the Woman’s Vote: Religion in the American Suffrage
Movement, 1848–1895, at 47–79, 340–54 (1989) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on
file with the Betsy Clark Living Archive, Boston University School of Law); HELEN LAKELLY
HUNT, AND THE SPIRIT MOVED THEM: THE LOST RADICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST
FEMINISTS (2017).
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freedom for “all of God’s children.”7 This ad fontes appeal, this call
to return to the urtexts and the precedents of the tradition to ground
revolutionary rights movements is a perennial and prominent
feature of Western law and theology.
“Back to the sources” is not only the common cri de couer of
revolutionaries. It is also, ironically, the common mantra of the
conservative American constitutional philosophy of “originalism,”
sometimes called “textualism.”8 “Originalism” is a canopy term
that covers a wide range of views of scholars and judges who
encourage interpretation of the United States Constitution in
accordance with the original “intent,” “meaning,” or
“understanding” of the eighteenth-century American founders or
framers who drafted and ratified the text, and put it into operation
after ratification.9 Originalists and their critics dispute whether “the
framers themselves . . . believe[d] such an interpretive strategy to
be appropriate.”10 They dispute which founders and which
historical texts should be included among the founders and when
the American founding era began and ended.11 They dispute
whether the proper focus should be on the final constitutional text
alone or (also) on the public meaning and legal uses and
applications of the text in the years after its ratification.12 And they
dispute whether the founders’ original intent—however
determined—governs, constrains, and binds modern judges or
only guides, informs, and inspires them in adjudicating
7. JACQUELINE A. BALL, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: I HAVE A DREAM (2006); ROBERT
M. FRANKLIN, LIBERATING VISIONS: HUMAN FULFILLMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT (1990).
8. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545–47 (2006). See generally ERIC J. SEGALL,
ORIGINALISM AS FAITH (2018).
9. See generally DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINALISM (2005); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105
GEO. L.J. 97 (2016); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611 (1999).
10. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 885 (1985); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
11. See generally Powell, supra note 10, at 885; ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B.
SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011); FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED
PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living
Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. L. REV. 1243 (2019).
12. See NATHAN S. CHAPMAN & MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, AGREEING TO DISAGREE:
HOW THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROTECTS RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE (forthcoming 2022).
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constitutional cases.13 But here, too, the originalists appeal to the
original constitutional text and its framers’ aims to ground and
legitimize arguments about the rule of constitutional law.
I come to this topic not as a constitutional lawyer but as a legal
historian interested in the development of human rights in the West
and in understanding key historical human rights texts in their
original context.14 This Article focuses on the urtext of American
religious freedom, namely, the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. My goal here is not to press an originalist
argument for any particular modern interpretation or school of
thought about the First Amendment.15 It is rather to present the
historical data that any originalist has to work with in pressing their
interpretation. I focus on where the First Amendment came from,
not what it became in the hands of later interpreters. I want to see
what is clear, and what is not so clear about the sixteen words that
comprise the First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”16
These First Amendment guarantees of no establishment and
free exercise of religion were created by the First Congress in 1789
and ratified by the states in 1791.17 The final text is clear on some
points (like its focus on “Congress”) but not on others (what does
“respecting an establishment of religion” mean?). The Congressional
record of the debates on these religion clauses is very slender—a
mere three pages, as we will see in full below—and we have no
record of the debates during the crucial final stages of drafting.18
We learn some more from the state ratification debates about
religious freedom—first in the states’ response to the 1787 draft
Constitution, then in their debates about the 1789 proposed Bill of
13. See generally Powell, supra note 10; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011);
BRADLEY C. S. WATSON, OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM (2009); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 8–31 (2010).
14. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 5; JOHN WITTE, JR., FAITH, FREEDOM, AND FAMILY: NEW
ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION (Norman Doe & Gary S. Hauk eds., 2021); WITTE,
REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 3; CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (John Witte, Jr.
& Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010); RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (John Witte, Jr. & M.
Christian Green eds., 2012).
15. For one such recent effort, see DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND
ORIGINAL INTENT (2010); DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, THE HOLLOW CORE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: WHY WE NEED THE FRAMERS (2020).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See infra notes 158–77 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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Rights, which includes the First Amendment.19 We learn as well
from the eleven states that had already drafted, debated, and
ratified their own state constitutional texts on religious freedom by
1784, which were important precedents adduced during the First
Amendment discussions.20 And we learn from the broader
discussions of religious freedom among the politicians, preachers,
and pamphleteers of the founding generation.
This Article peels through these layers of founding documents
before exploring the final sixteen words of the First Amendment
religion clauses. Part I explores the founding generation’s main
teachings on religious freedom, identifying the major principles
that they held in common. Part II sets out a few representative state
constitutional provisions on religious freedom created from 1776 to
1784. Part III reviews briefly the actions by the Continental
Congress on religion and religious freedom issued between 1774
and 1789. Part IV touches on the deprecated place of religious
freedom in the drafting of the 1787 United States Constitution. Part
V reviews the state ratification debates about the 1787
Constitution and introduces the religious freedom amendments
that they proposed to the First Congress tasked with drafting
new federal rights language. Part VI combs through all the
surviving records of the First Congress’ drafts and debates on
what became the First Amendment. Part VII parses the final
sixteen words of the religion clauses and sifts through what’s clear
and not so clear about the final words: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”21 The Conclusion distills my main findings
about the original understanding of the First Amendment and their
implications for originalists today.

19. See infra notes 142–57 and accompanying text. James Madison urged that the
original intent of the Bill of Rights should be sought in “the text itself . . . [and] the sense
attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions, where it recd. all the
authority which it possesses.” James Madison, From James Madison to Thomas Richie
(September
15,
1821),
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0321 (last visited Feb. 15,
2022). See also the quote from Madison in 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1855)
(“As the instrument came from [the drafter] it was nothing more than the draft of a plan,
nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the
people, speaking through their several State conventions.”) [hereinafter ANNALS].
20. See infra notes 78–89 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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I. FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Religious freedom was a common topic of discussion and
debate in the American founding era from ca. 1770 to ca. 1800. No
one figure or school of thought dominated the founders’
discussions. A variety of voices weighed in—federalists and antifederalists, liberals and republicans, slave-holders and
abolitionists, statesmen and philosophers, and churchmen from
many denominations: Puritans, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Baptists,
Methodists, Quakers, Moravians, and Catholics, most prominently.
Despite their ample differences, these diverse American
founders adopted and advocated six common principles of
religious freedom: (1) liberty of conscience; (2) free exercise of
religion; (3) religious pluralism; (4) religious equality;
(5) separation of church and state; and (6) no establishment of a
national religion. These six principles—some ancient, some
new—appeared regularly in the founders’ debates over religious
liberty and religion-state relations, although with varying
definitions and priorities. They were also commonly incorporated
into the original state constitutions, and they helped to shape the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. They remain at
the heart of the American experiment today—as central
commandments of the American constitutional order and as
cardinal axioms of a distinct American logic of religious liberty.22
A few features of each principle are worth highlighting.
First, the founders embraced the ancient Western principle of
liberty or freedom of conscience. For them, liberty of conscience
protected religious voluntarism—the “unalienable right of private
judgment in matters of religion,” the freedom to choose, change, or
discard one’s religious beliefs, practices, or associations.23 Faith was
not something inherited, predestined, or predetermined by birth,
status, or caste, the founders insisted. It was something to be chosen
and fashioned by each person using their reason, will, heart, and
experience. “The Religion . . . of every man must be left to the

22. JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 24–63 (4th ed. 2016).
23. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS 42
(Boston
1744),
Evans
Early
Am.
Imprint
Collection,
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N04455.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.
See
generally HUGH FISHER, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT: SET IN A TRUE LIGHT (1731).
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conviction and conscience of every man,” James Madison wrote, “and
it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”24
For the founders, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
conscience protected believers not only from traditional forms of
torture, inquisitions, pogroms, imprisonment, heresy trials, and
other such forms of “soule rape,” in Roger Williams’ pungent
phrase.25 It also protected them from official or popular coercion,
pressure, or inducements to accept certain religious beliefs or
practices or face penalties and deprivations for choosing another.26
In addition, this guarantee permitted persons to claim exemptions
and accommodations from military conscription orders, oathswearing requirements, state-collected church taxes, or comparable
general laws that conflicted with their core claims of conscience.27
As George Washington put it: “[T]he conscientious scruples of all
men should be treated with great delicacy and tenderness” and “as
extensively accommodated” as “the protection and essential
interests of the nation may justify and permit.”28
Second, the principle of free exercise of religion was the right to
act publicly and peaceably on one’s conscientious beliefs. Quaker
founder William Penn had already linked these two guarantees,
arguing that religious liberty requires “not only a mere Liberty of
the Mind, in believing or disbelieving” but equally “the Free and
Uninterrupted Exercise of our Consciences, in that Way of
Worship, we are most clearly pers[u]aded, God requires us to serve
Him . . . .”29 Alongside freedoms of worship and religious
24. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland, William M. E. Rachal, Barbara D.
Ripel & Fredrika J. Teute eds., 1973) [hereinafter Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance].
25. 3 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 220 (2007) (1963).
26. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 41–45.
27. See generally ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AGAINST THE
OPPRESSIONS OF THE PRESENT DAY (Boston 1773), Evans Early Am. Imprint Collection,
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N09952.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext; JONATHAN PARSONS,
FREEDOM FROM CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL SLAVERY, THE PURCHASE OF CHRIST (New
Bury-port
1774),
Evans
Early
Am.
Imprint
Collection,
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N10662.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext; Thomas Jefferson, Draft
of Bill Exempting Dissenters from Contributing to the Support of the Church, 30 Nov. 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 74–75 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
28. George Washington, Letter to the Religious Society Called Quakers, October, 1789, in
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 416 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). See also
GEORGE WASHINGTON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: SELECTIONS
FROM WASHINGTON’S LETTERS (Edward F. Humphrey ed., 1932).
29. William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Once More Briefly Debated and
Defended, by the Authority of Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity (1670), reprinted in THE POLITICAL
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assembly, most founders included protections for the freedoms of
religious speech, publication, education, charity, mission work,
pilgrimage, and more. They also called for religious groups “to
have the full enjoyment and free exercise of those purely spiritual
powers . . . as may be consistent with the civil rights of society,” and
to enjoy rights to religious property, polity, incorporation,
ecclesiastical discipline, and property tax exemption (and
sometimes state-collected tithes, too).30
Third, the founders regarded religious pluralism as an
important and independent principle of religious liberty, and not
just a sociological reality. Rather than having one established faith
per territory with separate classes of establishment conformists and
WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79, 82, 85 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., 2002) (emphasis omitted).
Presciently, a Dutch pamphleteer in 1584 had argued that true religious freedom requires
freedom of conscience as well as freedom of worship, speech, association, and education:
I know that they promise freedom of conscience provided there is no public
worship and no offence is given, but this is only to trap and ensnare us. For it is
well known that conscience which resides in people’s minds, is always free and
cannot be examined by other men and still less be put under their control or
command. And in fact, no one has ever been executed or harassed merely on
grounds of conscience, but always for having committed some public act or
demonstration, either in words, which are said to be an offence, or in acts which
are described as exercise of religion. There is no difference between so-called
freedom of conscience without public worship, and the old rigour of the edicts and
inquisition of Spain. . . . How is it then possible to grant freedom of conscience
without exercise of religion? For what are the consequences for people who wish
to enjoy the benefit of this freedom? If they have no ceremonies at all and do not
invoke God to testify to the piety and reverence they bear Him, they are in fact left
without any religion and without fear of God. . . . And I have not even mentioned
that one will not of course be allowed to state what one thinks; any one who says
any word detrimental to the dignity of the ecclesiastical state or the Roman religion
will be accused of acting scandalously or of desecrating human and divine
majesty. But this is only the start. The authorities will go further and search books
and cabinets and coffers, they will eavesdrop on private conversation, a father will
not be allowed to teach his children how to call on God, nor will we be allowed to
use our mother-tongue in our prayers. Soon, as I have said before, it will be
thought necessary to restore the edicts and the inquisition in their full
severity everywhere . . ..
Discourse of a Nobleman, a Patriot Partial to Public Peace, upon Peace and War in These Low
Countries, (1584), reprinted in TEXTS CONCERNING THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS 264,
265–66 (E.H. Kossmann & A.F. Mellink eds., 1974); see also WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 149–50.
30. LEVI HART, LIBERTY DESCRIBED AND RECOMMENDED 14 (1774), Evans Early Am. Imprint
Collection, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N11133.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext. See
generally Isaac Backus, Government and Liberty Described; and Ecclesiastical Tyranny Exposed (1778), in ISAAC
BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, PAMPHLETS, 1754–1789, at 349 (William G. McLoughlin
ed., 1968); 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 740–42 (1950) (quoting A
Declaration of Certain Fundamental Rights and Liberties of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Maryland).
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dissenting non-conformists, the founders called for a plurality of
forms of religious belief and worship, each equal before the law.
They also called for a plurality of religious forums that deserved
free exercise protection—sanctuaries, schools, charities, publishing
houses, Bible societies, missionary groups, and other such “little
platoons” of religion.31 Part of their argument for religious
pluralism was theological. As Baptist preacher Isaac Backus
argued, it was God’s “sole prerogative” to decide which forms and
forums of religion should flourish and which should fade, without
influence or interference by state, church, or anyone else.32 “God’s
truth is great, and in the end He will allow it to prevail.”33 Part of
their argument was political. Madison put it crisply in Federalist
Paper No. 51: “In a free government, the security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights; it consists in the one case in
the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity
of sects.”34 “Checks and ballances [sic]” are as important in religion
as in politics, John Adams concurred. They “are our only Security,
for the progress of Mind, as well as the Security of Body. Every
Species of these Christians would persecute Deists, as [much] as
either Sect would persecute another, if it had unchecked and
unballanced [sic] Power . . . . Know thyself, Human Nature!”35
Fourth, these principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise of
religion, and religious pluralism depended on a guarantee of
equality of all peaceable religions before the law. For the state to
single out specific persons, groups, or religious practices for
preferential benefits or discriminatory burdens would skew the
choices of conscience, encumber the free exercise of religion, and
31. See Benjamin Rush, Letter to John Armstrong (March 19, 1783), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 78–79. The phrase “little platoon” was made popular by
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 68 (9th ed. 1791). See also
WITTE, supra note 5, at 196–226 (documenting the range of religious properties and
organizations that received tax exemptions and other state benefits); Mark Storslee, Church
Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 150–68
(2020) (documenting the range of religious properties and organizations that received tax
exemptions and other state benefits with added focus on tax and legal treatment of religious
schools in the founding era).
32. BACKUS, supra note 30, at 317.
33. Id.; see also Washington, supra note 28; THE FREEMAN’S REMONSTRANCE AGAINST
AN ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENT 13 (1777).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
35. John Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, June 25, 1813, in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND
JOHN ADAMS 333, 334 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1988).
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upset the natural plurality of forms and forums of faith. Many of
the founders therefore called for equality of all peaceable religions
before the law.36 Madison captured the prevailing sentiment: “A
just Government . . . will be best supported by protecting every
Citizen in the enjoyment of his religion with the same equal hand
which protects his person and property; by neither invading the
equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those
of another.”37
The founders invoked this principle especially to fight against
religious-test oaths and loyalty oaths that were traditionally
imposed as a condition for political office and various state benefits
and had long contributed to the religious divisions of society and
politics.38 They also pressed this principle of equality to challenge
traditional state practices of discriminating in decisions about tax
exemption, religious incorporation, licenses for teachers, schools,
charities, missionary societies, and similar state-based benefits.39
Most founders called for religious equality of all peaceable
theistic religions, usually mentioning Christians and Jews, and
sometimes Muslims and Hindus, too, although they paid little heed
to the many Native American and African American religions of
the day.40 A few founders pressed for the legal equality of the
religious and nonreligious, too. Jefferson put it memorably: “The
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say
there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor
breaks my leg.”41 Such passages were unusual. Most of the
founders were concerned about the equality of peaceable theistic
religions before the law, not equality between religion and
nonreligion, which has become the norm in our day.
Fifth, the founders invoked the ancient Western principle of
separation of church and state, or what Saint Paul had already
called “a wall of separation.”42 This institutional separation served
36. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 49–52.
37. Madison, supra note 24, at 302.
38. See WITTE, supra note 5, at 105–37 (providing a case study of religious
establishment practices in Massachusetts before 1833).
39. Id.
40. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 47–51.
41. Thomas Jefferson, Query XVII: The Different Religions Received into That State, in THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON 673, 675 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
42. Ephesians 2:14. On the history of this concept, see JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST,
GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 207–42 (2007).
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to keep church and state officials and their operations free and
focused on their core missions of soulcraft and statecraft,
undistracted and well protected from the encroachments or
privations of the other. “Religion and government are equally
necessary, but their interests should be kept separate and distinct,”
wrote Jeffersonian pamphleteer Tunis Wortman.43 “Upon no plan,
no system, can they become united, without endangering the purity
and usefulness of both—the church will corrupt the state, and the
state pollute the church.”44 John Dickinson of Pennsylvania argued
similarly that when church and state “are kept distinct and apart,
the Peace and Welfare of Society is [sic] preserved, and the Ends of
both answered. But by mixing them together, Feuds, Animosities
and Persecutions have been raised, which have deluged the World
in Blood, and disgraced human Nature.”45 This understanding of
separation of church and state helped to inform the movement in
some states to exclude clergy and other religious officials from
holding political office or exercising political power.46
Some founders also called for separation of church and state in
order to protect the individual’s liberty of conscience.47 Madison
warned that church and state officials must not “be suffered to
overleap the great Barrier [between them] which defends the rights
of the people” to hold the religious beliefs and practices they
choose.48 Jefferson tied the “wall of separation” metaphor directly
to protection of liberty of conscience:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
a man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the [legitimate] powers of government reach
actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that [the] act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”
thus building a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering
to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress
43. Tunis Wortman, A Solemn Address to Christians and Patriots (1800), in POLITICAL
SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 1477, 1488 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2000).
44. Id.
45. John Dickinson, Centinel Number VIII, in THE CENTINEL: WARNINGS OF A
REVOLUTION 126, 128 (Elizabeth I. Nybakken ed., 1980).
46. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 55.
47. Id. at 55–56.
48. Madison, supra note 24, at 299.
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of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his
social duties.49

In Jefferson’s formulation, separation of church and state
assured individuals of their natural, inalienable right of conscience,
which could be exercised freely and fully up to the point of
breaching the peace or shirking their social duties. Jefferson was not
speaking here of separating politics and religion altogether. Indeed,
in the next paragraph of his letter, President Jefferson performed an
avowedly religious act of offering prayers on behalf of his Baptist
correspondents: “I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection
and blessing of the common Father and Creator of man.”50
Sixth, some founders also called for the disestablishment of
religion. This was the most novel and controversial principle in
the day.51 Seven of the original states and the four counties of New
York City insisted on retaining their own state religious
establishment even while calling for no national establishment of
religion by the emerging federal government.52 Though local
establishment practices varied, these states exercised some control
over religious doctrine, governance, clergy, and other personnel.53
They required church attendance of all citizens, albeit at a church
of their choice.54 They collected tithes for support of the church that
the tithe-payer attended, and often gave state money, tax
exemptions, and other privileges preferentially to one favored
religion.55 They imposed burdensome restrictions on education,
voting, and political involvement of religious dissenters.56 They
49. 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) (emphasis
added). This Washington edition of the letter inaccurately transcribes “legitimate” as
“legislative.” See a more accurate transcription in DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 148 (2003).
50. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 49.
51. NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012) [hereinafter NO
ESTABLISHMENT]; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 7–9, 57–62.
52. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at the Founding, in NO ESTABLISHMENT, supra
note 51, at 45–69; WITTE, supra note 5, at 105–37, 196–226. For earlier summaries see SANFORD
H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1968); STOKES, supra note
30; THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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obstructed the organization, education, and worship activities of
dissenting churches, particularly Catholics and Quakers.57 They
conscripted established church institutions and their clergy for
weddings, education, poor relief, political rallies, and distribution
of state literature.58 They often administered religious test oaths for
political officials, and sometimes even for lower state bureaucrats
and employees, too.59
But disestablishment movements were gaining rapid support
throughout the young American republic.60 Roger Williams
founded Rhode Island in 166261 and William Penn founded
Pennsylvania in 1682 on the principle of no establishment of religion.62
After the American Revolution, four more states disestablished
religion—New York, North and South Carolina, and Virginia.63
Over the next fifty years, all thirteen original states adopted
disestablishment policies, with Massachusetts holding out the
longest until 1833.64 All new states beyond the thirteen founding
states adopted the principle of non-establishment of religion,
although de facto establishment practices continued into the
twentieth century.65
Disestablishment of religion, the founders argued, was the best
way to integrate and protect all the other principles of religious
liberty. Disestablishment protected the principles of liberty of
conscience and free exercise of religion by foreclosing government
from coercively mandating or symbolically favoring certain forms
of religious belief, doctrine, and practice and skewing each person’s
choices and changes of faith and religious affiliation.66 As the
Delaware constitution stated: “[N]o authority can or ought to be
vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE
NEW AMERICAN STATES 1776–1833 (Carl H. Esbeck & Jonathan J. Den Hartog eds., 2019).
61. Id. at 55–70.
62. Id. at 71–96.
63. Id. at 97–202.
64. Id. at 399–425.
65. Id.; Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and
Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014).
66. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 59–60.
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interfere with, or in any manner controul [sic] the right of
conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.”67
Disestablishment of religion further protected the principles of
religious equality and pluralism by preventing government from
singling out certain religious beliefs and bodies for preferential
treatment, or favoring or privileging certain clerics, sanctuaries, or
forms of worship to the inevitable deprecation of all others.68
Virginia’s conventioneers called for government to “prevent the
establishment of any one sect in prejudice, to the rest, and will
forever oppose all attempts to infringe religious liberty.”69 Several
early state constitutions provided “there shall be no establishment
of any one religious sect . . . in preference to another . . . .”70
Finally, disestablishment of religion served to protect the
principle of separation of church and state.71 As Jefferson wrote, it
prohibited government
from intermedling [sic] with religious institutions, their doctrines,
discipline, or exercises [and from] . . . the power of effecting any
uniformity of time or matter among them. Fasting & prayer are
religious exercises. the [sic] enjoining them is an act of discipline,
every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times
for these exercises & the objects proper for them according to their
own peculiar tenets.72

To allow government to establish or even meddle in the internal
affairs of religious bodies would inflate the competence of
government, Madison added.
[It] implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge
of Religious Truth; or that he may employ religion as an engine of

67. DEL. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 2; see also PA. CONST., DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS § 2 (1776). See 18th Century Documents: 1700–1799, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L.
LIBR., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/18th.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2022), for
the original state constitutions quoted here and below. See also the collection in THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Francis Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe].
68. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 60.
69. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 208 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter Elliot, DEBATES]; see also
id. at 330, 431, 645–46.
70. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. XIX.
71. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 60–62.
72. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Rev. Samuel Miller (1808), in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 5:98–99.
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Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the
world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means
of salvation.73

The question that remained controversial in the founding era as
much as in our own was whether more gentle and generic forms of
governmental support for religion could be countenanced.74 Did
disestablishment of religion prohibit all such support—mandating
“a high and impregnable . . . wall of separation between church and
state,” as the Supreme Court later put it, quoting Jefferson75—or did
it simply require that such governmental support be distributed
non-preferentially among all religions? Some founders viewed the
principle of no establishment as a firm ban on all state financial and
other support for religious beliefs, believers, and bodies, including
traditional indirect forms of support like religious tax exemptions
and religious corporations.76 Others viewed this principle more
narrowly as a prohibition against direct financial support of one
preferred religion, but regarded non-preferential forms of state
funding and land grants for all religious schools, charities,
publishers, missionaries, military chaplains and the like as not only
permissible under a no-establishment policy, but necessary for
good governance.77
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, religious
pluralism, religious equality, separation of church and state, and
disestablishment of (at least a national) religion: These six religious
freedom principles circulated in the founding era, and they helped
to shape the first state constitutions as well as the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

73. Madison, supra note 24, at 301.
74. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 61–62.
75. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (“The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.”).
76. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 62.
77. See the collection of quotations from the founders in JAMES H. HUTSON,
FORGOTTEN FEATURES OF THE FOUNDING: THE RECOVERY OF RELIGIOUS THEMES IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1–44 (2003); VINCENT P. MUÑOZ, GOD AND THE FOUNDERS: MADISON,
WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON (2009); see also NO ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 51.
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Eleven of the thirteen original states issued new constitutions
between 1776 and 1784; Connecticut and Rhode Island retained
their colonial charters until 1819 and 1843, respectively.78 The
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 set the tone for the southern and midAtlantic colonies, just as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
shaped the constitutionalism of New England states.79 These
original state constitutions incorporated the founding principles of
religious freedom in various forms.
Virginia’s influential Bill of Rights of 1776 set its religious
freedom provisions in a basic natural rights and social contract
framework, but also grounded its guarantees of religious rights and
liberties on correlative moral duties and social virtues of “Christian
forbearance, love, and charity”:
I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety . . . .
XV. That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be
preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue and by frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles.
XVI. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards
each other.80

Pennsylvania opened its 1776 Constitution with the same social
contract and natural rights language, but focused more singly on
freedom of conscience and free exercise of all theistic religions:
78. See
18TH
CENTURY
DOCUMENTS
(The
Avalon
Project),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/18th.asp; see also CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, PHILLIP
M. CARROLL & THOMAS C. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); Vincent
Philip Muñoz, Church and State in the Founding-Era Constitutions, 4 AM. POL. THOUGHT
1 (2015).
79. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 29–93 (1998).
80. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (The Avalon Project) (1776),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp.
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II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
and understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against,
his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged
of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious
sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no
authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any
power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any
manner control, the right of conscience in the free exercise of
religious worship.81

The 1776 Constitution of New Jersey provided comparable
protections for freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion
against religious coercion and discrimination, and then spoke
against traditional Protestant religious establishments:
XIX. That there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect
in this Province, in preference to another; and that no Protestant
inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any
civil right, merely on account of his religious principles; but that
all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect.
who shall demean themselves peaceably under the government,
as hereby established, shall be capable of being elected into any
office of profit or trust, or being a member of either branch of the
Legislature, and shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege and
immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow subjects.82

The 1776 Constitution of Maryland was expansive in its
protection of religious conscience, free exercise of religion, and
equality of peaceable Christian believers, including explicit
protections for Quakers, Baptists (“Dunkers”), and Mennonites
who were conscientiously opposed to oath-swearing and military
service. Maryland also banned religious test oaths for political
office. Nonetheless, the new constitution allowed for state
collection of religious taxes to be directed to the taxpayer’s
preferred congregation. It vested the historically established
Anglican church in its expansive property holdings—quite unlike
81. CONSTITUTION
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
(The
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp.
82. CONSTITUTION
OF
NEW
JERSEY
(The
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp.

Avalon

Project)

(1776),

Avalon

Project)

(1776),
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neighboring Virginia that was calling for the dissolution of such
Anglican church property.83 At the same time, however, the
Maryland constitution put severe limits on new private donations
of property to all other religious groups:
XXXIII. That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons,
professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection
in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by any law
to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious
persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice; unless,
under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order,
peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality,
or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights; nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any particular place of
worship, or any particular ministry; yet the Legislature may, in
their discretion, lay a general and equal tax for the support of the
Christian religion; leaving to each individual the power of
appointing the payment over of the money, collected from him, to
the support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for
the benefit of the poor of his own denomination, or the poor in
general of any particular county: but the churches, chapels,
globes, and all other property now belonging to the church of
England, ought to remain to the church of England forever. And
all acts of Assembly, lately passed, for collecting monies for
building or repairing particular churches or chapels of ease, shall
continue in force, and be executed, unless the Legislature shall, by
act, supersede or repeal the same . . . .
XXXIV. That every gift, sale, or devise of lands, to any minister,
public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or to any
religious sect, order or denomination, or to or for the support, use
or benefit of, or in trust for, any minister, public teacher, or
preacher of the gospel, as such, or any religious sect, order or
denomination-and every gift or sale of good-e, or chattels, to go
in succession, or to take place after the death of the seller or donor,
or to or for such support, use or benefit-and also every devise of
goods or chattels to or for the support, use or benefit of any
83. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776–1787
(1977); THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JEFFERSON’S STATUTE IN
VIRGINIA (2013). In Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815), the United States Supreme Court
outlawed the dissolution of the Anglican Church’s corporation and properties in Virginia.
See also Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on
Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2001).
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minister, public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or any
religious sect, order, or denomination, without the leave of the
Legislature, shall be void; except always any sale, gift, lease or
devise of any quantity of land, not exceeding two acres, for a
church, meeting, or other house of worship, and for a buryingground, which shall be improved, enjoyed or used only for such
purpose-or such sale, gift, lease, or devise, shall be void.
XXXV. That no other test or qualification ought to be required, on
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of support
and fidelity to this State, and such oath of office, as shall be
directed by this Convention or the Legislature of this State, and a
declaration of a belief in the Christian religion.
XXXVI. That the manner of administering an oath to any person,
ought to be such, as those of the religious persuasion, profession,
or denomination, of which such person is one, generally esteem
the most effectual confirmation, by the attestation of the Divine
Being. And that the people called Quakers, those called Dunkers,
and those called Menonists [sic], holding it unlawful to take an
oath on any occasion, ought to be allowed to make their solemn
affirmation, in the manner that Quakers have been heretofore
allowed to affirm; and to be of the same avail as an oath, in all
such cases, as the affirmation of Quakers hath been allowed and
accepted within this State, instead of an oath. And further, on such
affirmation, warrants to search for stolen goods, or for the
apprehension or commitment of offenders, ought to be granted,
or security for the peace awarded, and Quakers, Dunkers or
Menonists [sic] ought also, on their solemn affirmation as
aforesaid, to be admitted as witnesses, in all criminal cases
not capital.84

The Constitution of New York (1777) set out its religious
freedom provisions in loftier language that was deeply critical of
traditional religious persecution brought on by the conflation of
religious and political authorities and accordingly called for the
separation of church and state officials:
XXXVIII. And whereas we are required, by the benevolent
principles of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but
also to guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance
wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests
and princes have scourged mankind, this convention
84. CONSTITUTION
OF
MARYLAND
(The
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp.

Avalon

Project)

(1776),
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doth . . . declare, that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all
mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted,
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
XXXIX. And whereas the ministers of the gospel are, by their
profession, dedicated to the service of God and the care of souls,
and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their
function; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatsoever, shall, at any time hereafter, under any
presence or description whatever, be eligible to, or capable of
holding, any civil or military office or place within this State.
XL. And whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of
every State that it should always be in a condition of defence [sic];
and it is the duty of every man who enjoys the protection of
society to be prepared and willing to defend it . . . . [But] all such
of the inhabitants of this State being of the people called Quakers
as, from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of
arms, be therefrom excused by the legislature; and do pay to the
State such sums of money, in lieu of their personal service, as the
same; may, in the judgment of the legislature, be worth.85

These early state constitutions formed the constitutional
backbone of religious freedom in the United States for the first 150
years of the republic. State constitution-making and enforcement
remained a complex and shifting legal business throughout this
period. Only Massachusetts and New Hampshire retained their
original constitutions of 1780 and 1784, respectively, albeit with
many amendments. Each of the other original states created at least
one new constitution after 1787—Georgia leading the way with ten
new constitutions, the last ratified in 1983.86 Thirty-seven new
states joined the union, each adding its own new constitution, half
of them adopting at least one replacement constitution before
1947—Louisiana leading the way with ten, the last ratified in 1921.87

85. CONSTITUTION
OF
NEW
YORK
(The
Avalon
Project)
(1776),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp.
86. See Thorpe, supra note 67, at 777–876.
87. Id.; see CYNTHIA E. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, at xxviii–xxix
(1973) (offering convenient tables); Thorpe, supra note 67 (offering multiple versions of each
state constitution).

1322

1323

Back to the Sources?

Religious freedom figured prominently in almost all these state
constitutions, with the founding principles of religious freedom
coming to varying forms of expression.88 The state constitutions
empowered state courts to hear constitutional cases from their own
citizens or subjects, notably including religious freedom claims.
These state cases, together with state legislative acts, helped translate
the founding principles of religious freedom into a rich latticework
of specific precepts, practices, and policies concerning religion.89
Long before the First Amendment religion clauses were
contemplated, let alone crafted, these state constitutional
laboratories were actively involved in leading the American
experiment in religious freedom.
III. RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
Alongside these early states was the budding national
government, called the Continental Congress. It began its work
already on the eve of the American Revolution. It was comprised
of delegates from the thirteen colonies, who met for the first time
on September 5, 1774, to respond to the increasingly harsh
economic and legal measures imposed on the colonies by the
English mother country.90 Its second session, commencing on May
10, 1775, was devoted to coordinating the Revolutionary War
against Great Britain. It was during this session that the Congress
began to take on the role as the provisional federal government of
a budding nation, a status later confirmed by the Articles of
Confederation (1781) that continued in force (albeit with decreasing
effectiveness) until 1789.
The Continental Congress’s principal mandate was to deal with
pressing issues of the military, interstate relationships, national
commerce, foreign diplomacy, and the like. But in the course of its
work from 1774 to 1789, the Continental Congress issued a number
of acts touching religion that are worth noting, since they came up
during the debates about the First Amendment.
88. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 98–116, 299–302 (providing examples of the
expression of each principle in state constitutions from 1791–1947).
89. See id. at 98–116 (providing summaries and sources).
90. See DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO ORIGINAL INTENT (2000); JAMES HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO
CENTURIES 95–138 (2008); MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, ENDOWED BY OUR CREATOR: THE BIRTH OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 43–66 (2012). For the record, see JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1904–1937).
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On the second day of its first session, September 6, 1774, the
Continental Congress resolved, after some vigorous debate, to open
its daily sessions with prayer. An Anglican priest began offering
these prayers the next morning, along with Bible reading.91 He was,
according to one representative, “a Gentleman of Sense and Piety,
and a warm Advocate for the religious and civil Rights
of America.”92 During the second session, on December 21, 1776,
the Congress appointed two legislative chaplains, an Anglican
priest and Presbyterian pastor, who served until 1784, until
replaced by two other chaplains appointed by the Congress.93
On July 29, 1775, the Congress created the Chaplain Corps of
the Continental Army and appointed and paid chaplains to serve
in it.94 Both as General and as first President, George Washington
was a firm supporter of these military chaplains and issued several
calls for Congress to increase the number of chaplains that served
and sent out several orders for military personnel to make ample
use of these chaplains’ services.95
In the summer of 1775, the Continental Congress vetted the
“Plan of Accommodation with the Parent State,” a proposed
negotiated compromise with Great Britain. It included this
provision: “No earthly legislature or tribunal ought or can of Right
interfere or interpose in any wise howsoever in the religion and
ecclesiastical concerns of the Colonies.”96
On June 12, 1775, Congress issued the first of its four fast-day
proclamations. It urged the colonists to observe a “day of public
humiliation, fasting and prayer; that we may, with united hearts
and voices, unfeignedly confess and deplore our many sins”; that
we may “be ever under the care and protection of a kind
Providence, and be prospered”; and “that virtue and true religion
may revive and flourish throughout our land.”97 On November 1,
1777, the Congress issued its first of what would become annual

91. DAVIS, supra note 90, at 73–75.
92. Id.; Letter from Samuel Adams to Joseph Warren, 1 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 26–27 (Sept. 9, 1774) (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1921–1936).
93. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 1:76.
94. Id. at 2:220; DAVIS, supra note 90, at 80–83.
95. DAVIS, supra note 90, at 80–83.
96. “[Letter of] the New York Delegates to the Provincial Congress” (July 6, 1775), in
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 1:155–56 (referencing and
quoting from this “Plan of Accommodation” in its P.S.).
97. Id. at 2:87–88.

1324

1325

Back to the Sources?

Thanksgiving Day proclamations. This first proclamation was an
overtly Trinitarian Christian statement, providing that
it is the indispensable Duty of all Men to adore the superintending
Providence of Almighty God; to acknowledge with Gratitude
their Obligation to him for Benefits received, and to implore such
farther Blessings as they stand in Need of . . . for the Defense and
Establishment of our Inalienable Rights and Liberties.98

The proclamation set aside a day each year for the confession of
sins and “solemn thanksgiving and praise”:
that with one heart and one voice the good people may express
the grateful feelings of their hearts, and consecrate themselves to
the service of their divine benefactor; and that, together with their
sincere acknowledgements and offerings, they may join the
penitent confession of their manifold sins, whereby they had
forfeited every favor, and their humble and earnest supplication
that it may please God through the merits of Jesus Christ,
mercifully to forgive and blot them out of remembrance: that it
may please him graciously to afford his blessing on the
governments of these states respectively, and prosper the public
council of the whole; to inspire our commanders, both by land and
sea, and all under them, with that wisdom and fortitude which
may render them fit instruments, under the providence of
Almighty God, to secure for these United States, the greatest of all
human blessings, independence and peace; that it may please
him, to prosper the trade and manufactures of the People, and the
labour of the husbandman, that our land may yield its increase; to
take schools and seminaries of education, so necessary for
cultivating the principles of true liberty, virtue and piety, under
his nurturing hand; and to prosper the means of religion, for the
promotion and enlargement of that Kingdom, which consisteth
“in righteousness, peace, and joy, in the Holy Ghost.”99

Beyond issuing thanksgiving proclamations and prayers, the
Continental Congress took further steps to cultivate both the moral
and religious sentiments of the budding nation. In 1774, for
example, Congress resolved to “encourage frugality, economy, and
industry, and . . . discountenance and discourage every species of

98. Id. at 9:854–55 (using the online Law Library Microform Collection, which has
modernized the capitalization and punctuation).
99. Id. at 9:855. (using the online Law Library Microform Collection, which has
modernized the capitalization and punctuation).
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extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse-racing, and all kinds
of gaming, cockfighting, exhibition of shews, plays, and other
expensive diversions and entertainments . . . .”100 All these worldly
activities were thought to detract from religion, piety, virtue,
and morality.
During the Revolutionary War against Great Britain, the
Continental Congress passed a resolution to protect pacifists’
conscientious objections to participation in war. Various religious
groups in the colonies—especially, Quakers, Mennonites, Shakers,
and Brethren—had professed pacifist scruples.101 The Congress
accommodated them in a resolution of 1775 and urged them to
assume non-combat duties instead:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot
bear arms in any case, this Congress intend [sic] no violence to
their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to
contribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief
of their distressed brethren in the several colonies, and do all other
services to their oppressed Country, which they can consistently
[do] with their religious principles.102

The Continental Congress was deeply concerned, however,
about Great Britain’s accommodation of Catholics north of the
border, in Quebec. In 1763, after the British-French war, Quebec
had become a British colony. In the Quebec Act of 1774, the British
Parliament had guaranteed to these new subjects “free exercise of
the religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the king’s
Supremacy.”103 The Congress denounced this act as tantamount to
“establishing the Roman Catholick religion” in a manner which is
“dangerous in an extreme degree to the Protestant religion and to
the civil rights and liberties of all America.” It expressed
“astonishment that a British Parliament should ever consent to
establish in that country a religion that has deluged your island in
blood, and dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder and
rebellion through every part of the world.” All such acts “are
impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well unconstitutional, and most

100. Id. at 1:78.; see also DAVIS, supra note 90, at 67, 175–98.
101. LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS IN AMERICA THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR (Peter Brock ed., 2002).
102. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 2:189.
103. The
Quebec
Act
of
1774,
14
Geo.
III
c.83,
§5
(Eng.),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/quebec_act_1774.asp.
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dangerous and destructive of American rights.”104 If this new
religious establishment in Quebec became subject to “the designs
of an ambitious and wicked minister,” Alexander Hamilton
declared breathlessly, “we may see an Inquisition erected in
Canada, and priestly tyranny may hereafter find as propitious a soil
in America as it ever has in Spain or Portugal.”105 It is hard to read
from the historical record whether this anti-Catholic tirade was
genuine religious sentiment or instead political concern about
America’s vulnerability to its strong Catholic neighbors in the
French north and the Spanish south.
The Congress abruptly softened its posture toward FrenchCanadian Catholics during the Revolutionary War with Britain,
now for obvious political reasons. George Washington, the new
commander of the Continental Army, set the tone with an early
instruction to his troops traveling to Quebec,
to avoid all Disrespect or Contempt of the Religion of the Country
and its Ceremonies—Prudence, Policy, and a true Christian Spirit
will lead us to look with compassion upon their Errors without
insulting them—While we are Contending for our own Liberty,
we should be very cautious of violating the Rights of Conscience
in others; ever considering that God alone is the Judge of the
Hearts of Men and to him only in this Case they are answerable.106

Congress echoed these sentiments in two letters to their
counterparts in Quebec. They urged them to cede from the British
and join the American cause, enticing them with guarantees of
religious freedom. To press their case, Congress also sent a
distinguished delegation to the north with this instruction:
You are further to declare, that we hold sacred the rights of
conscience, and may promise to the whole people, solemnly in our
name, the free and undisturbed exercise of their religion; and, to
the clergy, the full, perfect, and peaceable possession and
enjoyment of all their estates; that the government of everything
relating to their religion and clergy, shall be left entirely in the
hands of the good people of that province, and such legislature as
104. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 1:34–35, 66, 72, 88; see
T. JEREMY GUNN, A STANDARD FOR REPAIR: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, EQUALITY, AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 72–78 (1992).
105. 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 184–85 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
106. Letter from George Washington to Colonel Benedict Arnold (Sept. 14, 1775), in 1
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES, JUNE–SEPTEMBER 1775,
at 456 (P.D. Chase et al. eds., 1985–2010).
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they shall constitute; Provided, however, that all other
denominations of Christians be equally entitled to hold offices,
and enjoy civil privileges, and the free exercise of their religion,
and be totally exempt from the payment of any tythes [sic] or taxes
for the support of any religion.107

Also during the Revolutionary War, the Congress sought to
encourage defection of German mercenaries who were fighting for
Great Britain. It offered would-be defectors guarantees of liberty,
security, and property.108 It also ordered all states to receive these
soldiers and ensure that they “be protected in the free exercise of
their respective religions.”109
On September 11, 1777, a narrow majority of the Congress
voted to import 20,000 Bibles for distribution in the new states.110
No federal action of the sort was ever taken, however, largely due
to funding. Instead, the Congress resolved tepidly on
October 26, 1780:
That it be recommended to such of the States who may think it
convenient for them that they take proper measures to procure
one or more new and correct editions of the old and new
testament [sic] to be printed and that such states regulate their
printers by law so as to secure effectually the said books from
being misprinted.111

Thereafter, the Congress also endorsed a privately funded
translation of the Bible, directed the legislative and military
chaplains to make use of it, and recommended “this edition of the
Bible to the inhabitants of the United States . . . .”112
On July 9, 1778, the Congress approved the Articles of
Confederation, which came into effect in 1781.113 A prior draft of
the Articles, prepared principally by John Dickinson, a
Pennsylvania Quaker, had included a rather lengthy provision on
religious liberty designed to bind the individual colonies and states:

107. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 4:217.
108. Id. at 5:654.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 8:733–34.
111. Id. at 18:979.
112. Id. at 23:574.
113. Id. at 11:677–78; see also id. at 19:213–24; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (The Avalon
Project) (Mar. 1, 1781), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp.
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No person in any Colony living peaceably under the Civil
Government, shall be molested or prejudiced in his or her person
or Estate for his or her religious persuasion, Profession or practice,
nor be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute to
maintain any religious Worship, Place of Worship, or Ministry,
contrary to his or her Mind, by any Law or ordinance hereafter to
be made in any Colony different from the usual Laws & Customs
subsisting at the Commencement of this War—provided, that
such person frequents regularly some place of religious Worship
on the Sabbath; & no religious Persuasion or practice [sic] for the
Profession or Exercise of which, persons are not disqualified by
the present Laws of the said Colonies respectively, from holding
any offices Civil or military, shall by any Law or Ordinance
hereafter to be made in any Colony, be rendered a
Disqualification of any persons profession or exercising the same
from holding such offices, as fully as they might have done
heretofore: Nor shall any further Tests or Qualifications
concerning religious persuasion, Profession or Practise [sic], than
such have been usually administered in the said Colonies
respectively, be imposed by any Law or Ordinance hereafter to be
made in any Colony; and whenever on Election or Appointment
to any Offices, or any other occasions, the Affirmation of persons
conscientiously scrupulous of taking an Oath, hath been admitted
in any Colony or Colonies, no Oath shall in any such Cases be
hereafter imposed by any Law or Ordinance in any such Colony
or Colonies, it being the full Intent of these united Colonies that
all the Inhabitants thereof respectively of every Sect, Society or
religious Denomination shall enjoy under this Confederation, all
the Liberties and Priviledges [sic] which they have heretofore
enjoyed without the least abridgement of their civil Rights for or
on Account of their religious Persuasion, profession or
practice [sic].114

Had this article been enacted, it would have been a remarkable
step on the path toward creating a national law on religious liberty.
The Congress, however, rejected this article as too intrusive on local
state regulation of religion. Thus, a few scant words on religion
were all that remained in the Articles of Confederation: the final
Article III bound the states to “assist each other, against all force

114. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 5:547, referencing
Josiah Bartlett’s and John Dickinson’s Draft Articles of Confederation (June 17, 1776), in 4
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 233, 234–35 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976–2000);
see also quote in DAVIS, supra note 90, at 160–61.
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offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account
of religion . . . .”115
Four treaties adopted by the Congress included religious liberty
clauses. The Treaty with the Netherlands (1782) provided that
“[t]here shall be an entire and perfect liberty of conscience allowed
to the subjects and inhabitants of each party, and to their families,
and no one shall be molested in regard to his worship, provided he
submits as to the public demonstration of it, to the laws of the
country . . . .”116 The language recurred almost verbatim in a treaty
with Sweden (1783).117 A 1785 treaty with Prussia provided: “The
most perfect freedom of conscience and of worship, is granted to
the citizens or subjects of either party, within the jurisdiction of the
other, without being liable to molestation in that respect for any
cause other than an insult on the religion of others.”118 The final
peace treaty with England (1783) was also made “[i]n the name of
the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity.”119
The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, establishing a new territorial
government for the midwestern frontier, set forth various
“fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty,” including:
“No person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner
shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or
religious sentiments”; and “Religion, [m]orality and knowledge
being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, [s]chools and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged.”120
The record of the Continental Congress also includes other
scattered acknowledgments and endorsements of public worship,
Christian thanksgiving, Sunday observance, and confession of sin.
The record is also amply peppered with genial references to
Christianity and invocations of God. The most famous of these
divine invocations was the Declaration of Independence of 1776,
115. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 19:214.
116. Id. at 24:67–80; see Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 24, at 6:57–60
(shows Madison’s influence on this formulation).
117. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 24:457.
118. Id. at 30:275.
119. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Britannic
Majesty (September 3, 1783), United States Statutes at Large (8 Stat. 80).
120. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 32:340. On various
earlier drafts of the Northwest Ordinance, with more expansive language on religious
liberty, see EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF THE FOUNDERS: RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION,
1776–1826, at 115–17, 151–56 (2d ed. 2004).
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with its references to “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God,” “the
Creator,” “the Supreme Judge of the world,” and “a firm reliance
on the protection of Divine Providence.”121
IV. RELIGION AND THE 1787 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Continental Congress waned in power and influence after
the Revolutionary War had ended. Lacking the power to tax and
lacking a federal judiciary, the Congress depended too heavily
upon the cooperation and comity of increasingly antagonistic
states. By 1787, the states agreed to call a federal constitutional
convention to create a more robust national government. The
convention met from May 25 to September 17, 1787, to hammer out
a draft constitution.
The United States Constitution is largely silent on questions of
religion and religious freedom. The preamble to the Constitution
speaks generically of the “Blessings of Liberty.”122 Article I,
section 7 recognizes the Christian Sabbath: “If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law.”123
Article VI provides “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.”124 A reference to “the Year of our Lord” sneaks into the
dating of the instrument.125 But nothing more.
The seeming impiety of the work of the 1787 Constitutional
Convention must be understood in political context. It was
commonly assumed at the convention that questions of religious
liberty were for the states and the people to resolve, not the
budding federal government. The mandate of the 1787 convention
was to create a new national sovereign with enumerated powers
and delineated procedures. Whatever was not specifically given to
this new federal sovereign was to be retained by the sovereign
states and the sovereign people. Federal power over religion,
beyond the incidental religious acts of the Continental Congress,
was simply not considered part of this new constitutional calculus.
As James Madison put it to the Virginia Ratification Convention:

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See various examples in DAVIS, supra note 90, at 57–72, 95–116.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Id. art. I, § 7.
Id. art. VI.
Id. art. VII.
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“There is not a shadow of right in the general government to
intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a
most flagrant usurpation.”126 James Iredell concurred in the North
Carolina Ratification Convention, arguing that the federal branches
of government “certainly have no authority to interfere in the
establishment of any religion whatsoever, and I am astonished that
any gentleman should conceive they have.”127
Federal protection of religion was also considered unnecessary
or beyond the mandate of the 1787 convention. Both the natural
checks and balances inherent in the nation’s religious pluralism and
the new religious liberty provisions of the state constitutions were
considered to be sufficient protection.128 It was thought
unnecessary, even dangerous, for the emerging federal constitution
to guarantee religious and civil rights. James Wilson famously
insisted in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention that “a bill of
rights is neither an essential nor a necessary instrument in framing
a system of government, since liberty may exist and be as well
secured without it.”129 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton warned in
Federalist Paper No. 84 that to specify federal rights was:
not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would
even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to
powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power
to do?130

Accordingly, the three weak attempts to introduce federal
protections of religion and religious liberty into the new
constitution did not succeed. Early in the convention debates, on
May 29, 1787, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina submitted to the
convention a draft constitution that included a religion clause: “The
Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on the subject
of Religion.”131 Although many of Pinckney’s proposed provisions
126. ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 3:314–18, 330; see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 66 (2d. ed. Neil Cogan ed., 2015).
127. ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 4:194.
128. See id. at 3:207–08, 313, 431.
129. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 143-44 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
130. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1787 (1966).
131. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 129, at 1:23; 3:599.
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(including against religious oaths) helped to shape the debates and
the final form of the Constitution, his religious liberty clause was
passed over without recorded comment and evidently died
silently. On September 12, five days before the conclusion of the
convention, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry moved to designate
a committee to attach a bill of rights to the largely completed
Constitution. The motion failed 10–0.132 And, on September 14
James Madison joined Pinckney in proposing that Congress be
given power “to establish an [sic] University, in which no
preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of
religion.”133 The motion failed 6–4.
Even Benjamin Franklin’s motion to have the convention
sessions open with prayer—as the Continental Congress
did—garnered virtually no support. On June 28 the elderly
Franklin, exasperated by the casuistic debates in the convention to
date, had issued a short sermon to his fellow delegates on the
importance
of prayer:
[W]e have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the
Father of lights to illuminate our understandings? In the
beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we were sensible
of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the divine
protection . . . . And have we now forgotten that powerful friend?
or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance? I have
lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing
proofs I see of this truth—that God governs in the affairs of men. And
if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it
probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been
assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that “except the Lord build the
House they labour in vain that build it.” I firmly believe this; and
I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in
this political building no better than the Builders of Babel[.]134

Franklin’s motion failed, the record reads, for fear it might “1. bring
on it some disagreeable animadversions. & 2. lead the public to
believe that the embarrassments and dissentions within the

132. Id. at 2:587–88.
133. Id. at 2:616.
134. Id. at 1:451–52 (footnote omitted). For recollections of this speech by other
convention members, see id. at 3:471–72, 479, 499, 531. See also id. at 3:296–97 (Franklin’s own
reflections on this motion).
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convention, had suggested this measure.”135 Moreover, another
delegate pointed out, there were no funds to pay a chaplain to pray.136
The only proposal about religion to receive support was
Charles Pinckney’s proposal that religion not be considered a
condition for federal office. On August 20 Pinckney had proposed
a freestanding provision in the Constitution prohibiting religious
tests or qualifications for federal office.137 On August 30 he moved
to amend a clause specifying the oath of office with the words that
would eventually find their way into Article VI of the Constitution:
“but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
office or public trust under the authority of the U. States.”138 Only
one delegate objected to the motion—not because he favored
religious test oaths, but because he thought “it unnecessary, the
prevailing liberality being a sufficient security [against] such
tests.” Pinckney’s motion, however, was seconded and passed,
with one dissent.139
During the ratification debates and thereafter, the no-religioustest provision of Article VI was sometimes denounced as an
invitation to “Papists” and “Mahometans,” and even “infidels,”
“atheists,” and “pagans,” to hold federal office.140 It was defended,
as we saw, on principles both of liberty of conscience and equality
of faiths before the federal law.141 But in the 1787 convention itself,
the almost casual passage of the prohibition against religious tests
for federal office was testimony to the commonality of the
assumption that religion and religious liberty were beyond the pale
of federal authority.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
4:195–99.
141.
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See id. at 2:340–342.
Id. at 2:468; see also US. CONST. art. VI.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 129, at 2:468.
See ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 2:44, 119, 148–49, 199, 215; 3:207–08;
See id.
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V. RATIFICATION AND PROPOSED RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AMENDMENTS
In these state ratification debates about the draft Constitution,
the absence of a bill of rights—particularly the lack of a religious
liberty guarantee—was a point of considerable controversy.
Thomas Tredwell’s reservations, stated in the 1788 New York
Ratification Convention, were typical: “I could have wished also
that sufficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious
liberties, and to have prevented the general government from
tyrannizing over our consciences by a religious establishment.”142
Despite the repeated assurances of the federalists that Congress
could not and would not exercise power over subjects like religion
that were not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, only four
states would ratify the instrument without a federal bill of rights.
The remaining states ratified the Constitution only on the condition
that the First Session of Congress would prepare a bill of rights to
amend the Constitution. These states discussed and proposed
provisions to be included in a federal bill of rights, including
various religious liberty clauses.143 Below, I have put these
proposals in bold and numbered them in the order of their
appearance for easier reference in the analysis that follows.
In early December 1787 the Pennsylvania ratification
convention repeatedly discussed a proposed amendment on
religious liberty. A strong federalist, Benjamin Rush, thought the
Constitution was fine as written and was even a miracle: “the hand
of God was employed in this work, as that God had divided the
Red Sea to give passage to the children of Israel, or had fulminated
[sic] the Ten Commandments from Mount Sinai.”144 A strong antifederalist, William Findley, however, pressed for a strong religious
liberty amendment to the federal constitution. On December 15,
1787, he proposed:

142. Id. at 2:399 (Intervention on July 1, 1788).
143. I omit the repeated attempt of South Carolina, in the ratification and congressional
debates, to have Article VI amended to read “no other religious test shall ever be required.”
See id. at 1:325. Such an amendment would have allowed for introduction of religious oaths
through the prior clause of Article VI binding all federal officials “by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution.” See U.S. CONST. art. VI. The proposal received no support each
time it was raised. See ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 1:325; ANNALS, supra note 19, at
1:807; S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1:122 (1789).
144. 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 47 (John P. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1984).
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[1] The rights of conscience shall be held inviolable; and neither
the legislative, executive nor judicial powers of the United States,
shall have authority to alter, abrogate, or infringe any part of the
constitution[s] of the several States, which provide the
preservation of liberty in matters of religion.145

The Pennsylvania convention ultimately did not propose this draft
to the First Congress, but Findley, in his capacity as an elected
Representative to the First Congress, discussed it with
fellow Representatives.146
On February 6, 1788, a minority faction of the Massachusetts
ratifying convention proposed the following amendment,
introducing the principle of the freedom of conscience:
[2] [T]hat the said Constitution be never construed to authorize
Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights
of conscience.147

On April 21, 1788, a minority group in the Maryland ratification
convention proposed two religious liberty amendments, neither of
which was ultimately recommended by that convention, although
again these views were known to the First Congress. Their concerns
were for the principles of conscience (now for pacificists), religious
equality, and no national establishment:
[3] That no persons conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms,
in any case, shall be compelled personally to serve as a soldier.
[4] That there be no national religion established by law; but
that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty.148

145. 7 THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL OR THE NORTH-AMERICAN INTELLIGENCER 348, Dec. 19,
1787, at 1, https://www.newspapers.com/paper/the-freemans-journal-or-the-northamerican/1238/ [hereinafter THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL]; see also 25 PROVIDENCE GAZETTE AND
COUNTRY JOURNAL 1255, Jan. 19, 1788, at 1 [hereinafter PROVIDENCE GAZETTE].
146. Only Findley’s recollections serve as records of such discussions. See generally
WILLIAM FINDLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON “THE TWO SONS OF OIL”: CONTAINING A VINDICATION
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, AND DEFENDING THE BLESSINGS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
TOLERATION AGAINST THE ILLIBERAL STRICTURES OF THE REV. SAMUEL B. WYLIE (1812). See also
OWEN S. IRELAND, RELIGION, ETHNICITY, AND POLITICS: RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1995) (alteration in original).
147. Reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE: SELECTED READINGS ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 415–16
(Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009).
148. ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 1:553.
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A majority of the Maryland ratification convention did accept
the recommendation of a third proposal that protected the rights of
conscience in oath swearing:
[5] That all warrants without oath, or affirmation of a person
conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, are
grievous and oppressive . . . .149

On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire proposed the following
religious liberty amendment focused for the first time on limiting
“Congress” alone, and now prohibiting any laws about religion or
infringing on conscience:
[6] Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe
the rights of conscience.150

On June 26, 1788, Virginia—stating its concern “that no right, of
any denomination” may be violated and “among other essential
rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be
cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the
United States”151—proposed the following amendments:
[7] [A]ll warrants . . . to search suspected places, or seize any
freeman, his papers or property, without information upon oath
(or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an
oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive . . .
and ought not to be granted.152

Virginia’s further proposal integrated several of the founders’
principles of religious freedom, further making clear that religion
was theistic and involved both rights and duties, reason and faith:
[8] That religion, or the duty which we owe to our creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion
according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular
religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law
in preference to others.153

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 551.
Id. at 1:326.
Id. at 1:327.
Id. at 3:593.
Id. at 1:594.
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On July 26, 1788, New York’s proposal efficiently interlinked
the principles of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion,
religious equality, and no preferential religious establishment:
[9] That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right
freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion, according to the
dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought
to be favoured or established by Law in preference to others.154

On August 1, 1788, North Carolina—after resolving to protect
the “great principles of civil and religious liberty” and expressing
its concern that “the general government may not make laws
infringing their religious liberties”155—repeated the Virginia
provision (with only cosmetic changes in punctuation), and
prefaced it by a conscientious objection clause for pacifists:
[10] That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought
to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ
another to bear arms in his stead.156

Rhode Island repeated in full North Carolina’s language in its
proposed amendment, belatedly tendered on June 16, 1790, after
the Congress had already prepared the Bill of Rights and sent it to
the states for ratification.157
VI. DRAFTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS CLAUSES
It was up to the First Congress to cull from these proposals, and
the broader perspectives that they represented, a suitable
amendment on religious rights and liberties to include in the Bill of
Rights. The record of the Congress’s effort is disappointingly slim,
given the importance of the moment. There is no official record of
proceedings of either the House or the Senate in that first year.
Instead, the Senate met in closed session and merely kept a journal
of very brief minutes of its resolutions. The House debates were
sometimes open to visitors and thus some discussion is preserved.
But much of what appears in the Annals of Congress for the First
154. Id. at 1:328.
155. Id. at 4:191–92 (This is the language from the intervention by Henry Abbot about
religious test oaths on July 30, 1788.).
156. See id. at 1:331–32; 4:243–44.
157. Id. at 1:333–35. The Avalon Project collection of documents dates this ratification
as May 29, 1790. See generally The Avalon Project, Ratification of the Constitution by the State of
Rhode Island; May 29, 1790, avalon.law.yale.edu/ 18th_century/ratri.asp (last visited
Feb. 14, 2022).
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House Session of 1789 is drawn from the inexactly taken and
transcribed notes of newspaper reporter Thomas Lloyd.158 These
minutes and notes do include several proposed drafts of the
religion clauses that were considered intermittently between June
8 and September 26, 1789. They also include summaries and
paraphrases of a few of the House debates on August 15, 17, and
20. But for the critical stages of deliberation in late August and
September 1789, when these various drafts and speeches were
pressed into the final text of the First Amendment, the record is
exceedingly cryptic and conclusory—leaving courts and
commentators ever since with ample room for speculation and
interpolation. The pages below reproduce all the surviving data
from these debates, with the proposed drafts again numbered and
highlighted, to set up the detailed analysis of the next section.
On June 8, 1789, James Madison, representing Virginia in the
House, now took up the call to help prepare a bill of rights to the
United States Constitution. He had reduced the multiple state
proposals for religious rights provisions into two religion clauses.
These he put to the House for consideration:
[11] The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or any pretext, infringed.
[12] No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.159

The House agreed to consider Madison’s proposals in due course.
But debate was postponed for several weeks as Congress devoted
itself to the immediate task of organizing the new government.160
On July 21, again prompted by Madison, the House finally
turned to Madison’s proposals and appointed a committee
comprised of one representative of each state represented in the
First Congress.161 Madison, representing Virginia, was included.
158. See Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd’s Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18 WM. &
MARY Q. 519 (1961); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986).
159. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:451–52.
160. See id. at 1:468.
161. Id. at 1:685–86. The committee included John Vining of Delaware, Abraham
Baldwin of Georgia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Aedanus Burke of South Carolina,
Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, George Clymer of Pennsylvania, Elias Boudinot of
New Jersey, and George Gales of Maryland.
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This committee of eleven put forward its proposed rights
provisions on July 28, including three separate provisions
on religion:
[13] no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed.
[14] no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms.
[15] no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the
freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury
in criminal cases.162

The committee’s report was tabled without any recorded
discussion. On August 13, the House, sitting as a committee of the
whole, took up the report, one provision at a time.
On August 15, the House reached the first of the three
committee provisions on religion: “no religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.” The
House ultimately approved an amended version of the same. The
full record of this debate (concluding with a modified provision)
reads thus:
Mr. SYLVESTER had some doubts of the propriety of the mode of
expression used in this paragraph. He apprehended that it was
liable to a construction different from what had been made by the
committee. He feared it might be thought to have a tendency to
abolish religion altogether.
Mr. VINING suggested the propriety of transposing the two
members of the sentence.
Mr. GERRY said it would read better if it was, that no religious
doctrine shall be established by law.
Mr. SHERMAN thought the amendment altogether unnecessary,
inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to
them by the constitution to make religious establishments; he
would, therefore, move to have it struck out.
Mr. [Daniel] CARROLL.—As the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch
of governmental hand; and as many sects have concurred in
opinion that they are not well secured under the present
162. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:757, 778, 783; see also THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 27, at 5:92–93.
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constitution, he said he was much in favor of adopting the words.
He thought it would tend more towards conciliating the minds of
the people to the Government than almost any other amendment
he had heard proposed. He would not contend with gentlemen
about the phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in
such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of
the community.
Mr. MADISON said, he apprehended the meaning of the words
to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce
the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God
in any manner contrary to their conscience. Whether the words
are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had been
required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to
entertain an opinion that under the clause of the constitution,
which gave power to Congress to make all laws necessary and
proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the laws made
under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might
infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion;
to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was
intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the
language would admit.
Mr. HUNTINGTON said that he feared, with the gentleman first
up on this subject, that the words might be taken in such latitude
as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He understood
the amendment to mean what had been expressed by the
gentleman from Virginia; but others might find it convenient to
put another construction upon it. The ministers of their
congregations to the Eastward were maintained by the
contributions of those who belonged to their society; the expense
of building meetinghouses was contributed in the same manner.
These things were regulated by by-laws. If an action was brought
before a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who had
neglected to perform his engagements could not be compelled to
do it; for a support of ministers, or building of places of worship
might be construed into a religious establishment.
By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be established
by law; he could give a history of the effects of such a regulation;
indeed the people were now enjoying the blessed fruits of it. He
hoped, therefore, the amendment would be made in such a way
as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the
rights of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no
religion at all.
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Mr. MADISON thought, if the word national was inserted before
religion, it would satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He
believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform. He thought if the
word national was introduced, it would point the amendment
directly to the object it was intended to prevent.
Mr. LIVERMORE was not satisfied with that amendment; but he
did not wish them to dwell long on the subject. He thought it
would be better if it was altered, and made to read in this manner,
that [16] Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
infringing163 the rights of conscience.
Mr. GERRY did not like the term national, proposed by the
gentleman from Virginia, and he hoped it would not be adopted
by the House. It brought to his mind some observations that had
taken place in the conventions at the time they were considering
the present constitution. It had been insisted upon by those who
were called antifederalists, that this form of Government
consolidated the Union; the honorable gentleman’s motion shows
that he considers it in the same light. Those who were called
antifederalists at that time complained that they had injustice
done them by the title, because they were in favor of a Federal
Government, and the others were in favor of a national one; the
federalists were for ratifying the constitution as it stood, and the
others not until amendments were made. Their names then ought
not to have been distinguished by federalists and antifederalists,
but rats and antirats.
Mr. MADISON withdrew his motion, but observed that the words
“no national religion shall be established by law,” did not imply
that the Government was a national one; the question was then
taken on Mr. Livermore’s motion [16 above], and passed in the
affirmative, thirty-one for, and twenty against it.164

On August 17, the House came to the second provision on
religion in the committee report: “no person religiously scrupulous
shall be compelled to bear arms.” The record of their debate, which
ended inconclusively, reads thus:

163. THE CONNECTICUT JOURNAL, Aug. 26, 1789, at 3; MASSACHUSETTS SPY, OR THE
WORCESTER MAGAZINE 855, Aug. 27, 1789, at 2. Both report Livermore’s motion thus, without
the word “infringing”: “The Congress shall make no laws touching the rights of religion, or
the rights of conscience.”
164. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:757–59.
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Mr. GERRY—This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to
secure the people against the mal-administration of the
Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of
the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this
kind would be removed. Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this
clause would give an opportunity to the people in power to
destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those
religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms.
....
. . . Now, if we give a discretionary power to exclude those from
militia duty who have religious scruples, we may as well make no
provision on this head. For this reason, he wished the words to be
altered so as to be confined to persons belonging to a religious sect
scrupulous of bearing arms.
Mr. JACKSON did not expect that all the people of the United
States would turn Quakers or Moravians; consequently, one part
would have to defend the other in case of invasion. Now this, in
his opinion, was unjust, unless the constitution secured an
equivalent: for this reason he moved to amend the clause, by
inserting at the end of it, “upon paying an equivalent, to be
established by law.”
Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, inquired what were the words
used by the conventions respecting this amendment. If the
gentleman would conform to what was proposed by Virginia and
Carolina, he would second him. He thought they were to be
excused provided they found a substitute.
Mr. JACKSON was willing to accommodate. He thought the
expression was, “No one, religiously scrupulous of bearing arms,
shall be compelled to render military service, in person, upon
paying an equivalent.”
Mr. SHERMAN conceived it difficult to modify the clause and
make it better. It is well known that those who are religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms are equally scrupulous of getting
substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many of them would rather
die than do either one or the other; but he did not see an absolute
necessity for a clause of this kind. We do not live under an
arbitrary Government, said he, and the States, respectively, will
have the government of the militia, unless when called into actual
service; besides, it would not do to alter it so as to exclude the
whole of any sect, because there are men amongst the Quakers
who will turn out, notwithstanding the religious principles of the
society, and defend the cause of their country. Certainly it will be
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improper to prevent the exercise of such favorable dispositions, at
least whilst it is the practice of nations to determine their contests
by the slaughter of their citizens and subjects.
Mr. VINING hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it
stood, because he saw no use in it if it was amended so as to
compel a man to find a substitute, which, with respect to the
Government, was the same as if the person himself turned out
to fight.
Mr. STONE inquired what the words “religiously scrupulous”
had reference to: was it of bearing arms? If it was, it ought so to
be expressed.
Mr. BENSON moved to have the words “but no person religiously
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms,” struck out. He
would always leave it to the benevolence of the Legislature, for,
modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such
a manner as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this
indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no
natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the
Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a
question before the Judiciary on every regulation you make with
respect to the organization of the militia, whether it comports with
this declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix
matters of doubt with fundamentals.
I have no reason to believe but that the Legislature will always
possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a
matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left for
their discretion.
The motion for striking out the whole clause being seconded, was
put, and decided in the negative—22 members voting for it, and
24 against it.165

Later that same day of August 17, the House debated the third
of the provisions recommended by the committee: “no State shall
infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech
or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.”
It approved a slightly amended version:
Mr. TUCKER.—This is offered, I presume, as an amendment to
the constitution of the United States, but it goes only to the
alteration of the constitutions of particular States. It will be much

165. Id. at 1:778–80.
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better, I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves,
and not to interfere with them more than we already do; and that
is thought by many to be rather too much. I therefore move, sir, to
strike out these words.
Mr. MADISON conceived this to be the most valuable
amendment in the whole list. If there was any reason to restrain
the Government of the United States from infringing upon these
essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be
secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they
provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against
the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to
the people.
Mr. LIVERMORE had no great objection to the sentiment, but he
thought it not well expressed. He wished to make it an affirmative
proposition; [17] “the equal rights of conscience, the freedom of
speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases, shall not be infringed by any State.”
This transposition being agreed to, and Mr. TUCKER’s motion
being rejected, the clause was adopted.166

Up to this point, the House had considered its rights
amendments as individual provisions to be inserted at appropriate
places in the body of the Constitution. On August 20, the House
agreed to consolidate these multiple rights provisions, including
those on religion, into a more systematic and uniform
“supplement” to the Constitution—a separate bill of rights.167
The three provisions on religion discussed to date were distilled
into two provisions. The record of the debate (on August 20) on
these two provisions is quite brief:
On motion of Mr. AMES, the fourth amendment was altered so as
to read: [18] “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience.” This being adopted, the first proposition was
agreed to.
Mr. SCOTT objected to the clause in the sixth amendment, “No
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”
He observed that if this becomes part of the constitution, such
persons can neither be called upon for their services, nor can an
equivalent be demanded; it is also attended with still further
166. Id. at 1:783–84.
167. See id. at 1:795–96.
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difficulties, for a militia can never be depended upon. This would
lead to the violation of another article in the constitution, which
secures to the people the right of keeping arms, and in this case
recourse must be had to a standing army. I conceive it, said he, to
be a legislative right altogether. There are many sects I know, who
are religiously scrupulous in this respect; I do not mean to deprive
them of any indulgence the law affords; my design is to guard
against those who are of no religion. It has been urged that
religion is on the decline; if so, the argument is more strong in my
favor, for when the time comes that religion shall be discarded,
the generality of persons will have recourse to these pretexts to
get excused from bearing arms.
Mr. BOUDINOT thought the provision in the clause, or
something similar to it, was necessary. Can any dependence, said
he, be placed in men who are conscientious in this respect? or
what justice can there be in compelling them to bear arms, when,
according to their religious principles, they would rather die than
use them? He adverted to several instances of oppression on this
point, that occurred during the war. In forming a militia, an
effectual defence ought to be calculated, and no characters of this
religious description ought to be compelled to take up arms. I
hope that in establishing this Government, we may show the
world that proper care is taken that the Government may not
interfere with the religious sentiments of any person. Now, by
striking out the clause, people may be led to believe that there is
an intention in the General Government to compel all its citizens
to bear arms.
Some further desultory conversation arose, and it was agreed to
insert the words “in person” to the end of the clause; after which
it was adopted . . . . [This yielded [19] “No person religiously
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in person.”]168

On August 22, these two provisions on religion, along with
other amendments, were referred to a House style committee.169
Two days later, the committee issued its final report. The report
included a slightly revised version of the first provision on religion,
which had been introduced by Fisher Ames on August 20. It
omitted the second provision altogether without explanation. This
final House version was sent on August 25 to the Senate for
consideration. It read: [20] “Congress shall make no law
168. See id. at 1:796.
169. See id. at 1:808.
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establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor
shall the rights of conscience be infringed.”170
On September 3, the Senate took up debate of this religious
liberty provision clause proposed by the House. No record of the
Senate debate survives. The Journal of the Senate reports that a
motion to adopt the House provision on religion was defeated, as
was a later motion to strike it.171 The Journal then reports that three
alternative drafts of the religion clauses were proposed and
defeated. These read seriatim:
[21] Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or
society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience
be infringed.172
[22] Congress shall not make any law infringing the rights of
conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society.173
[23] Congress shall make no law establishing any particular
denomination of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed.174

Although none of these versions passed, the Senate did agree
on a fourth proposal on September 3:
[24] Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.175

Agreement on this clause, however, was short-lived. On
September 9, the Senate passed a rather different version of the
religion clause, now combined with clauses on free speech, press,
and assembly.
[25] Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and petition to the government for
the redress of grievances.176

170. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 159 (Linda DePauw et al. eds., 1977).
171. See S. JOURNAL., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1:70 (1789).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 1:77.
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That same day, September 9, the Senate sent this final version
to the House for approval. After the House rejected this version, a
joint committee, comprised of three representatives and three
senators was appointed to forge a consensus draft. Representing
the House were three members of the original committee of eleven
that had prepared the draft religion clauses of July 28—Madison;
Roger Sherman, a Puritan from Connecticut; and John Vining, a
Republican from Delaware. Representing the Senate were Oliver
Ellsworth, a Connecticut Republican; William Patterson, an
Evangelical from New Jersey; and Charles Carroll, a Catholic from
Maryland. No record of their debate survives.
On September 24, 1789, the joint committee reported the final
text that came to be the First Amendment:
[26] Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.177

On September 25, the Senate concurred in the House resolution
to send the draft bill of rights, including this provision on religion,
to President Washington. It was sent the following day, and the
President sent it to the states for ratification. The final vote needed
for ratification, from Virginia, was recorded on December 15, 1791,
rendering the amendments effective from that day forward.
VII. “ORIGINAL INTENT”: INTERPRETING THE FINAL TEXT
We are now in position to see the challenge facing interpreters:
What is the original understanding or intent of the First
Amendment religion clauses? Is there only one correct or plausible
interpretation, or many? The final text of the First Amendment
itself has no plain meaning. The congressional record, such as it is,
holds no Rosetta Stone for easy interpretation and no “smoking
gun” that puts all evidentiary disputes to rest. Congress considered
twenty-five separate drafts of the religion clauses—ten drafts
tendered by the states, ten debated in the House, five more debated
in the Senate, and then the final draft forged by the joint committee
of the House and Senate. The congressional record holds no
conclusive argument against any one of the drafts and few clear
clues on why the sixteen words that comprise the final First
Amendment text were chosen.

177. Id. at 1:86-87; see also ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:948.
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An originalist approach to these historical sources could offer
either a “thinner” or “thicker” reading of the First Amendment
religious freedom guarantee.178 By “thinner” reading, I mean
making a gestalt judgment about what the final sixteen words
together mean at minimum, given the various earlier drafts and the
surviving political debates about them. By “thicker” reading, I
mean judging each word or phrase of the final First Amendment
text and setting out the range of possible, plausible, and likely
meanings that the drafters and ratifiers might have had in mind,
drawing on contemporaneous data so much as possible. The two
subparts that follow set out the evidence and arguments for these
thinner and thicker readings.
A. A Thinner Reading
A thinner reading is that the final text of the religion clauses is
a compromise agreement only on the outer boundaries of
appropriate congressional action on religion. The First Amendment
sets clear outer limits to Congress’s actions toward religion.
Congress may not establish or prescribe religion; nor may Congress
prohibit or proscribe religion. Nothing more, nothing less.
While that might sound minimalist to modern ears, this was
already a marked departure from the common practice of most
European national governments at the close of the eighteenth
century. England, for example, still made communicant status in
the Anglican Church a condition for national citizenship and for
many positions and privileges in state and society.179 Protestants
were only tolerated by the state, and with substantial limits on their
freedom.180 Catholics and Jews remained formally banned from the

178. See MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND
ABROAD (1994); SETH D. KAPLAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THICK AND THIN SOCIETIES:
UNIVERSALITY WITHOUT UNIFORMITY (2018).
179. See detailed contemporaneous discussion in RICHARD BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL
LAW (6th ed. 1797). Relevant statutes are included in JOHN GODOLPHIN, REPERTORIUM
CANONICUM; OR, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS OF THIS REALM CONSISTENT
WITH THE TEMPORAL: WHEREIN THE MOST MATERIAL POINTS RELATING TO SUCH PERSONS AND
THINGS, AS COME WITHIN THE COGNIZANCE THEREOF ARE SUCCINCTLY TREATED. WHEREUNTO
IS ADDED AN APPENDIX (1680).
180. See 1 Will & Mary c. 18 (1689); see also various other acts collected in SOURCES OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A SELECTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM A.D. 600 TO THE
PRESENT 607–79 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds. & trans., 1937).
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land until the Emancipation Acts of 1829 and 1858, respectively.181
Similarly, just as the First Amendment was being crafted and
ratified, French authorities were ransacking the Catholic Church
and its vast properties, literature, and artwork, and murdering
hundreds of its clergy, monks, and congregants with reckless
abandon,182 having done the same to French Calvinists a century
earlier.183 The First Amendment clearly commanded the new
Congress of the United States to do nothing of the sort.
On this thinner reading, the First Amendment leaves open to
later discussion and development which governmental bodies,
besides Congress, might be bound by its terms. Earlier drafts of the
First Amendment proposed by the state ratification conventions or
debated in the first Congress had sought to bind “the national
government” and even “the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the United States” (Draft Nos. 1, 4, 11). Other drafts had
tried to bind the states by name: “no state may infringe [or
“violate”] the equal rights of conscience” (Nos. 12, 15, 17). Other
drafts had been written in the passive voice and were thus
potentially applicable to all government officials: “no religion shall
be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed”; “the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable
right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion according to the
dictates of conscience” (Nos. 1, 4, 8–11, 13, 14, 19). But in several
earlier drafts (Nos. 2, 6, 16, 18, 20–25) and in the final text,
“Congress” alone was singled out for special limitations on issues
of religion in a way that no other Amendment in the Bill of Rights
seeks to do. Nothing is said about what state governments or the
executive or judicial branch of the federal government can do. That
181. Catholic Emancipation Act, 10 Geo. 4 c. 7 (1829); Jewish Relief Act 21 & 22 Vict. c.
49 (1858). An 1833 Jewish Emancipation Act passed the House of Commons but was blocked
in the House of Lords. See generally H.S.Q. HENRIQUES, THE JEWS AND THE ENGLISH LAW
(1908); U. R. Q. Henriques, The Jewish Emancipation Controversy in Nineteenth-Century England,
40 PAST & PRESENT 126–46 (1968).
182. See documents in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 75–118 (John F. Maclear ed., 1995); CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES:
A COLLECTION OF HISTORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 201–13, 234–49, 355–71
(Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall eds. & trans., 1954); with discussion in NIGEL ASTON,
THE END OF AN ELITE: THE FRENCH BISHOPS AND THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION
1786–1790 (1992); DONALD GREER, THE INCIDENCE OF THE TERROR DURING THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION 37–107 (1937); FRANÇOIS SOUCHAL, LE
VANDALISME DE LA RÉVOLUTION (1993).
183. ELISABETH ISRAELS PERRY, FROM THEOLOGY TO HISTORY: FRENCH RELIGIOUS
CONTROVERSY AND THE REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES (1973).
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can be read as a deferral of the question of whether the states and
other branches of the federal government can be bound by the
religion clauses. Or it can be read as a settlement of the question:
the use of the clear and certain language of “Congress” necessarily
excluded other branches and levels of government from the limits
imposed by the First Amendment.
On this thinner reading, the First Amendment also leaves open
to later discussion and development what government laws short
of prescribing or proscribing religion are forbidden. Earlier drafts
of the establishment clause had included much more sweeping and
exact language: Congress was not to “touch” or “favor” religion;
not to give “preference” to any religious sect, society, or
denomination; not to “establish” any articles of faith or mode of
worship (Nos. 6, 8–10, 16, 21–23, 25). Such provisions were left aside
for the blunter provision that Congress could simply not do
anything that would point to or come too close to (“respect”) an
establishment of religion. It was left an open question whether the
First Amendment outlaws congressional conduct that favors
religion but is not necessarily of a sort traditionally associated with
or close to becoming an established religion.
Likewise, the various drafts of the free exercise clause had
included much more sweeping guarantees: Congress was not to
“touch,” “infringe,” “abridge,” “violate,” “compel,” or “prevent”
the exercise of religion or the rights and freedom of conscience
(Nos. 2, 6, 11–13, 15–18, 20–23). Again, such provisions were left
aside for the blunter provision: Congress could simply not
“prohibit” the free exercise of religion. It was left an open question
whether the First Amendment forbids government laws and
conduct that fall short of outright prohibition of religious exercise.
Such a thin reading of the religion clauses comports with the
eighteenth-century ideal that the new Constitution was to be a basic
blueprint of government, not a comprehensive code of
governmental conduct. The First Amendment simply sets the outer
boundaries to appropriate congressional action—no prescription
and no proscription of religion. But it leaves the middle way
between these outer boundaries open to legislative and judicial
discussion and development. The founders knew that this middle
way was not uncharted and that the discussion was not
unprincipled. After all, the twenty-five earlier drafts of the religion
clauses included five of the six main principles of religious liberty
regularly discussed in the founding era. Concern for the liberty (or
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rights or scruples) of conscience appears in twenty drafts. Free
exercise appears in nine drafts, religious equality in ten, religious
pluralism in six, and disestablishment in thirteen. (Conspicuously
absent from all the drafts is the phrase, “separation of church
and state.”)
B. A Thicker Reading
The record of the debates over the religion clauses can also
support somewhat more nuanced interpretations that seek to
unpack the possible, plausible, and likely meanings of each word
or phrase in the final text. The temptation to self-serving presentmindedness increases, of course, as one thickens the interpretation.
But even a cautious reading of the spare record of the formation of
the First Amendment, viewed in contemporaneous context,
suggests a bit more about the original understanding of at least
some of the words and phrases.
1. “Congress“
The specification of “Congress” underscored the founders’
general agreement that the religion clauses were binding not on the
states but on the most dangerous branch of the new federal
government, the Congress. This was the strong sentiment already
in the Continental Congress, and it continued in the 1787
Constitutional Convention and the state ratification debates. It was
repeated in the surviving speeches of Roger Sherman, Samuel
Livermore, Eldridge Gerry, and Roger Tucker in the House, which
we quoted above.184
Three of the draft religion clauses submitted by the state
ratification conventions had specified “Congress” (Nos. 1, 2, and 6).
Six other state drafts submitted in the summer of 1788 included
various guarantees of religious liberty, written in the passive voice,
that could be read to bind both federal and state governments (Nos.
3, 5–10). In his June 8, 1789, consolidated draft, Madison had sought
to accommodate both readings by outlawing a “national”
establishment and by prohibiting states from infringing the rights
of conscience (Nos. 11, 12). This construction failed, despite
Madison’s two arguments for it in the August 15 debate.185 The

184. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:778–80, 783–84.
185. Id. at 1:757–59.
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original focus on “Congress” became the norm, with the original
New Hampshire version (No. 6) successfully reintroduced in the
House by Charles Livermore of New Hampshire (No. 16) as
the template.
In his same June 8 draft, Madison had also included generic
guarantees of religious liberty without specifying the government
entity bound thereby—“the full and equal rights of conscience shall
not be infringed,” and “the civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religion” (No. 11). Such provisions, too, died without
explanation. By August 20, Fisher Ames’s draft (No. 18) specified
Congress alone, and the Senate held to this. The First Amendment’s
focus on “Congress” is clear.
2. “Shall make no law”
The phrase “shall make no law” is rather distinctive—written
in a future active imperative voice, as our grammar teachers would
say. In eighteenth-century parlance, “shall,” as opposed to “will,”
is an imperative;186 it is an order, rather than a prediction, about
what Congress does in the future. “Shall” is so used fifteen times in
the Bill of Rights alone, in such provisions as: “No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner;”187 “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation;”188 “Excessive bail shall not be
required”189 and the like. But why the construction “shall make no
law,” which is a phrasing unique to the First Amendment? Could
it be that Congress could make no new laws on religion but could
confirm laws that had already been made—before the First
Amendment was passed, or by the Continental Congress before it?
Such a reading seems fanciful until one notes the exchange in
the House on September 25, 1789, the very day the House approved
the final text of the religion clauses. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey,
who chaired the recorded House debates on the religion clauses,
announced that “he could not think of letting the session pass over
186. See entries under “shall” and “will” in JOHN ANDREWS, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY
ed. 1789); JOHN ASH, A NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 1773); WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st Am. ed.
1788); A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
188. Id. amend. V.
189. Id. amend. VIII.
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
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without offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United
States of joining, with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their
sincere thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon
them.”190 He then moved that both houses of Congress request the
President to set aside a day of “public thanksgiving and prayer, to
be observed by acknowledging . . . the many signal favors of
Almighty God.”191 Aedanus Burke of South Carolina thought this
too redolent of a European military custom, which made “a mere
mockery of thanksgiving.”192 Thomas Tucker, also of South
Carolina, objected:
[I]t is a business with which Congress ha[s] nothing to do; it is a
religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us. If a day of
thanksgiving must take place, let it be done by the authority of the
several States; they know best what reason their constituents have
to be pleased with the establishment of the Constitution.193

Roger Sherman countered that the tradition of offering such public
prayers was “laudable” and after citing a few biblical precedents
for it, declared the practice “worthy of Christian imitation on the
present occasion.”194 Boudinot defended his motion on grounds
that it was “a measure both prudent and just” and quoted “further
precedents from the practice of the late [Continental] Congress” to
drive home his point. The motion passed in the House and later also
in the Senate.195 President Washington set aside a Thanksgiving Day
and gave a robust proclamation on October 3, 1789.196
This was not the only such inherited tradition touching religion
that the First Congress confirmed and continued. On April 15, 1789,
before deliberating the religion clauses, the Congress voted to
appoint “two Chaplains of different denominations” to serve
Congress, one in each house.197 On April 27 the Congress ordered,
190. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:949–50.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1:958–59.
196. Thanksgiving Proclamation of 1789, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-sources-2/article/thanksgivingproclamation-of-1789/(last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
197. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:19–20 (reporting that the Senate voted for its chaplain
on April 25, 1789); id. at 1:241–42 (recording that the House voted for its chaplain on May 1,
1789).
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relevant to the pending inauguration of President Washington:
“That after the oath shall have been administered to the President,
he, attended by the Vice President, and members of the Senate, and
House of Representatives, proceed to St. Paul’s Chapel, to hear
divine service, to be performed by the Chaplain of Congress
already appointed.”198 These chaplains served the Congress
throughout the period of the debates on the religion clauses. On
September 22, 1789, just as the joint committee was polishing the
final draft of the religion clauses, Congress passed an act
confirming their appointment and stipulating that the chaplains
were to be paid a salary of $500 per annum.199 Similarly, on August
7, 1789, after the committee of eleven had put to the House its three
proposed religion clauses (Nos. 13–15), the Congress reenacted
without issue the Northwest Ordinance, with its two religion
clauses: “No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and
orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode
of worship or religious sentiments”; and “Religion, morality, and
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.”200
The First Congress thus did “make” laws on religion, but
almost all these “new” laws echoed the old laws of the Continental
Congress. Perhaps it was just political inertia or nostalgia that
guided Congress. Perhaps it was a conscious desire to maintain a
few of the settled national traditions that had kept the fragile
country together over the prior fifteen tumultuous years. Perhaps
the new Congress was simply repeating what many new state
legislatures had done immediately after their new state
constitutions were in place—to confirm that their colonial legal
traditions and their English antecedents would all continue to be in
effect with presumptively constitutionality, unless they were
explicitly outlawed by the new state constitutional text or outlawed
by subsequent legislation or judicial interpretation.201 It is notable,
198. Id. at 1:25. A slightly reworded version was passed in the House on April 29, 1789.
Id. at 1:241.
199. First Cong., Sess. 1, ch. 13, 71 § 4 (1789).
200. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 130, 131 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 5th ed.
1949). However, this does not appear in the ANNALS for August 7, 1789. See ANNALS, supra
note 19, at 1:59–62, 710–14.
201. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 25 (“The common law of England, as well as so
much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this state, shall remain
in force unless they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature, such parts only
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as we saw, that when the first federal congressmen in 1789 raised
constitutional objections to supporting chaplains, prayers,
Thanksgiving proclamations, and religious education,202 the
majority argued successfully that these were simply continuations
of old laws and policies on religion, not the creation of new ones.
These measures thus evidently did not violate the First
Amendment command that “Congress shall make no law
respecting” religion.
One cannot lean too heavily on this construction and
application of the phrase “shall make no law.” First, the
congressional record is too cryptic to decide whether such a subtle
play on words was deliberate. Second, it must be remembered that
the First Congress served as both a legislature and a constitutional
drafter in 1789. Its legislative acts were driven by the fleeting
necessities of the time, its constitutional amendments by the
enduring needs of the nation. The two kinds of acts should not be
conflated. Nonetheless, the First Congress seemed to have had little
compunction about confirming and continuing the Continental
Congress’s tradition of supporting chaplains, prayers,
Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and religious education. And, in
later sessions in the 1790s and 1800s, the Congress also continued
the Continental Congress’s practice of including religion clauses in
its treaties, condoning the preparation of an American edition of
the Bible, funding chaplains in the military, and celebrating
religious services officiated by congressional chaplains—all with
very little dissent or debate.203 The ease with which Congress
passed such laws does give some guidance on what forms of
religious support the First Congress might have condoned.

excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Constitution and the
declaration of rights, &c., agreed by this convention.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 6, art. 6
(“All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the Province,
Colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practised on in the courts of law, shall
still remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the legislature; such parts only
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in this constitution.”) See
further examples of such early reception statutes here: https://www.iuslaw.org/commonlaw-reception-statutes/(last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
202. See supra note 200.
203. Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Federal-Missionary Partnerships: New Light on the
Establishment Clause, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2020); Storslee, supra note 31.
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3. “Respecting an establishment of religion”
This phrase is remarkably unclear, particularly the word
“respecting.” Thirteen drafts of the religion clauses included
references to the “establishment” of religion, but the only debate
that has survived is the brief and inconclusive discussion of August
15 on the draft: “no religion shall be established by law” (No. 13).
In eighteenth-century dictionaries, to “establish” something meant
“to settle firmly,” “to fix unalterably,” “to make firm,” “to ratify,”
“to ordain,” “to enact,” “to set up,” to “build firmly.”204 On this
dictionary definition, then, Congress was not permitted to “settle,”
“fix,” “define,” “ordain,” “enact,” or “set up” the nation’s religious
doctrines and liturgies, clergy and property, which Parliament had
done for England and its colonies—and seven of the new American
states were still doing per their own state constitutions.
No founder publicly supported the idea of Congress
“establishing” a single national religion that “fixed,” “defined,”
and “settled” by law the doctrine, liturgy, worship, religious canon,
and other traditional features of established Christianity. The new
American nation wanted no royal or presidential Supreme Head of
a national Church of America like the Crown and Church of
England; no bench of bishops sitting in Congress; no prescribed
Book of Common Prayer that set the nation’s liturgy, lectionary, and
religious calendars; no mandated King James Version of the Bible;
no church courts with jurisdiction over family, charity, education,
inheritance, defamation, and the like.205 Those prevailing English
establishment and ecclesiastical law patterns were all well beyond
the pale for the young American republic.
But the final text of the First Amendment does not simply state
that “Congress shall not establish religion” or “make laws
establishing religion” or generically outlaw “a national
establishment of religion”—as earlier drafts had done. The final
wording is more ambiguous: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.” The important new word is
“respecting.” It appears nowhere in any of the twenty-five drafts of
the First Amendment, but emerged, without explanation, in the
final draft from the joint House-Senate committee. We have no
204. See entries under “establish” and “establishment” in Andrews, supra note 186;
Ash, supra note 186; Johnson, supra note 186; Perry, supra note 186; and THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1884–1928).
205. See BURN, supra note 179; GODOLPHIN, supra note 179.
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record of any debate regarding this word, and “respecting” is a
studiously ambiguous term. It is variously defined in eighteenthcentury dictionaries as: “to look at, regard, or consider”; to “heed
or pay attention to”; “to regard with deference, esteem, or honor”;
and to “expect, anticipate, look toward.”206
There are three plausible readings of the final text, which might
overlap.207 The first is that Congress shall make no laws
“respecting” a state establishment of religion. That is, Congress could
make no law that “looked at,” “regarded,” or “paid attention to” a
state establishment of religion—whether favorably or unfavorably.
This would make the First Amendment a complement to the Tenth
Amendment, which reserved to the states any powers not explicitly
given to the Congress.208 In 1789, after all, several states still had
some form of religious establishment, which both their state
legislatures and constitutional conventions defined and defended,
often against strong opposition from religious dissenters.
Moreover, Virginia had just passed Jefferson’s ironically titled bill
“for the establishment of religious freedom,” also against firm
opposition but now by defenders of the traditional establishment
of Anglicanism.209 Having just defended their state establishments
(of whatever sort) at home, the new members of Congress were not
about to relinquish control of them to the new federal government.
The first minority proposal from Pennsylvania stated that
federalist concern directly: “neither the legislative, executive, nor
judicial powers of the United States, shall have authority to alter,
abrogate, or infringe any part of the constitutions of the several
States, which provide the preservation of liberty in matter[s] of
religion” (No. 1). North Carolina, too, stated its concern that “the
general government may not make laws infringing their religious

206. See entries under “respect” and “respecting” in Andrews, supra note 186; Ash,
supra note 186; Johnson, supra note 186; Perry, supra note 186; and THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1884–1928).
207. See, e.g., Chapman & McConnell, supra note 12; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the
Establishment Clause 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 59 (2017).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
209. THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM
THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823);
see THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JEFFERSON’S STATUTE IN
VIRGINIA (2013).
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liberties.”210 Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire zeroed in on
Congress, the dangerous new law-making body, with the latter
stating simply: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion”
(Nos. 2 and 6).
This federalist concern continued in the House debates. Several
House members said they feared that Congress might pass laws
that interfered in religious matters—particularly through the
“necessary and proper clause” of Article I, which Madison had
signaled as the danger point during the August 15 debate.211 There
was also some concern—reflected both in Huntington’s second
intervention on August 15212 and in Benson’s intervention on
August 17213—about state actions on religion being adjudicated in
the federal courts. Madison, we saw, argued that his provision
prohibiting a “national” establishment would allay all these fears
so that no “one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel
others to conform.”214 But he got nowhere with this argument.
Gerry thought the matter should be dropped.215 Livermore thought
it better to say simply: “Congress shall make no laws touching
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.”216 That language
was provisionally passed, and the focus on “Congress” persisted in
the House and later Senate debates.
To be sure, the First Congress had already quite explicitly
rejected those drafts of the religion clauses that bound the states
directly and also rejected those that were cast in more general terms
or in passive voice (not merely directed at “Congress”) and thus
potentially binding on the states (Nos. 1, 4, 8–15, 17, and 19). And
to be sure, the Tenth Amendment (which was under discussion in
the Congress at the same time) guaranteed generally: “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”217 But perhaps
on so sensitive an issue as religion, it was best to be triply sure—and
210. See Draft No. 10, supra text accompanying note 156. This is the language from the
intervention by Henry Abbot about religious test oaths on July 30, 1788, in ANNALS, supra
note 19, at 4:191–92.
211. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:757–59.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1:778–80.
214. Id. at 1:757–59.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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explicitly outlaw any congressional interference in the states’
establishments of religion or provisions for religious freedom.
Perhaps, in the final House-Senate committee of six, it was the hard
political issue of federal versus state power that was resolved by
adding the curious phrase “respecting an establishment.”
It would be considerably easier to press this first reading of the
“respecting” language if the final draft said “a state establishment,”
rather than “an establishment.” But since reference to “state
establishments” had not appeared before in the twenty-five earlier
drafts, perhaps the final committee thought it prudent to avoid
introducing a new contested term so late in the debate—particularly
given the squabbling over the term “national establishment” in the
August 15 House debate. This federalist reading is how the
language was sometimes defended in the state ratification debates
over the draft Bill of Rights. As James Iredell put it to his fellow
conventioneers in North Carolina: “Each state . . . must be left to the
operation of its own principles” when it comes to religion.218
A second plausible reading of the “respecting” text is that
Congress could neither establish religion outright nor make laws
that would “point toward,” “anticipate,” or “reflect” such an
establishment. On this reading, Congress could not pass a
comprehensive new law on religion defining the texts, doctrines,
and liturgies of the nation’s faith and/or governing religious polity,
clergy, and property. Such a law, redolent of the Anglican
establishments that prevailed on the American Revolution, would
clearly be unconstitutional, and no founder argued for this national
establishment policy. But that was not the founders’ real fear,
according to this reading. They also feared stepping on a slippery
slope or introducing “the nose of the camel in the tent.”219 Thus they
prohibited Congress from making more discrete laws that might
“respect”—that is, point toward, anticipate, or move in the
direction of—such an establishment. The First Congress’s concern
was to prevent not only a single comprehensive law that
established a national religion but also piecemeal laws that would
move incrementally toward the same.
The establishment clause, on this reading, was not necessarily a
prohibition against all laws “touching” religion, as some earlier
drafts had indicated (No. 6 and 16). After all, the new Congress,
218. ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 4:195.
219. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
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echoing the Continental Congress, had already passed several such
laws—supporting chaplains, prayers, religious education, and
Thanksgiving Day proclamations.220 Such laws presumably did not
point or move toward an established religion but simply reflected
commonplaces of the day about what was proper for the young
nation. But the establishment clause was a rather firm barrier
against a large number of laws touching religion that might move
toward an establishment.
This second reading turns on a crucial judgment about why the
First Congress had rejected earlier drafts that were more specific
about defining a religious establishment. On August 15, the House
debated whether to outlaw “religious establishment” per se (No.
13). There seemed to be consensus on this, as Roger Sherman said
early in the debate.221 The moment that the representatives began
to specify what they meant by religious establishment, however,
the conversation broke down: Elbridge Gerry was concerned about
establishing religious doctrines,222 Benjamin Huntington about
forced payments of religious tithes,223 James Madison about
compulsory worship of God and giving preeminence to one
sect224—all of which were features of a traditional establishment of
religion. The initial compromise was Samuel Livermore’s clause
that insisted the Congress make “no law touching religion” at all
(No. 16). By August 20, the House had returned to the language that
opened the August 15 debate: “Congress shall make no law
establishing religion” (No. 18). That was the language sent to the
Senate. The Senate also could not nuance this “no establishment”
formulation—failing to reach agreement on drafts that would
outlaw the establishment of “one Religious Sect or Society” or of
“articles of faith or a mode of worship” or that would outlaw the
preference of one religious sect, society, or denomination (Nos.
21–23, 25). On this second reading of the establishment clause, the
word “respecting,” therefore, becomes something of an umbrella
term for these and other features of a religious establishment.
Congress could not agree on what specifics of religious
establishment to outlaw—and so they simply outlawed the

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See supra text accompanying notes 92–95, 97–99, 111–12.
ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:778–80.
Id. at 1:757–59.
Id.
Id.
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establishment of religion altogether and anything that “reflected,”
“pointed to,” or “moved toward” the same.
On the first reading of the “respecting” language, the
establishment clause is a limited prohibition against congressional
interference with state controls of religion. Read as a federalism
clause, it leaves little guidance for what Congress might do at the
federal level respecting (an establishment of) religion. On the
second reading, the establishment clause is a comprehensive
prohibition against any congressional inclination toward
establishing religion. This leaves some room for Congress to pass
laws “touching religion,” but not much—save maybe those earlier
actions by the Continental Congress. These two prominent
readings of the phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” do
not exhaust the possibilities, but they set the sharpest contrasts on
an interpretive spectrum that offers a host of alternatives.
This leads to consideration of a third reading that splits the
difference. The establishment clause, on this third reading, simply
outlaws preferential support for a “national religion,” but allows
for “nonpreferential” support for multiple religions. On this
reading, the feature of “establishment” that concerned Congress
most was not to outlaw a grand establishment scheme but to avoid
official “preferences” for one religious sect, denomination,
doctrine, or mode of worship that “reflected” (that sense of
“respecting”) the old religious establishments which allowed one
faith per territory, with mere toleration at best of some
other religions.
This reading emphasizes the principles of religious pluralism
and religious equality over the “preferentialism” of traditional
religious establishments. Seven drafts of the religion clauses,
including the penultimate one, sought to formulate the
establishment clause this way by outlawing various types of
“preferential” establishments by name (Nos. 8–10, 21–23, 25). All of
these drafts failed. But, the argument goes, Congress accomplished
its goal of outlawing preferential support more efficiently by
simply prohibiting laws against “an” establishment of this sort—
rather than prohibiting laws against “the” establishment of religion
altogether. On this formulation, Congress could certainly “touch
religion”—rather generously in fact—so long as it did so in a way
that did not prefer one religious sect or society above another. And
Congress demonstrated what such nonpreferential support meant
by appointing and funding chaplains from different
1362
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denominations, supporting general “religious education,” and
condoning pious but nondenominational prayers and
Thanksgiving Day proclamations.
This “nonpreferential” reading of the establishment clause,
while plausible, relies heavily on Madison’s rejected concern about
“national establishment.”225 Moreover, it does rather little to
explain the insertion of the curious word “respecting” and uses a
tertiary dictionary definition of “reflecting.” It also relies heavily on
a clever linguistic distinction between “an” and “the” establishment
of religion—words on which the sloppy congressional record
slipped more than once.226
4. “Or”
Some modern judges and jurists are still debating whether there
is one religion clause or two—and whether these should actually be
called “clauses” (given that they have no subjects or predicates) or
more properly “guarantees.”227 They further debate whether there
is a necessary tension between the two phrases. The argument for
tension runs like this: any time government establishes or favors
one religion, it of necessity impinges the freedom of all other
religions to exercise their faith. And, in turn, anytime government
gives special support to the free exercise of (one) religion, it of
necessity has moved toward (“respected”) the establishment of that
(one) religion. The argument against tension runs like this: the no
establishment of religion guarantee means that government may
not evaluate, approve, or disapprove any religion, and the free
exercise of religion guarantee means that individuals and groups
are free to practice whatever religion they choose. The point of both
“clauses” (to use the conventional language) is to leave the field of
religion entirely free—to view it as a structural constraint on
the Congress.228

225. Id.
226. See id. at 1:948, transcribing the final Senate version of the free exercise clause:
“prohibiting a free exercise thereof.” See also id. at 1:451, 778–80, variously quoting Madison’s
call for disestablishment of “any” and “a” religion.
227. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991).
228. See Carl Esbeck, The First Federal Congress and the Formation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, in NO ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 51, at 208–51; IRA C. LUPU &
ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 3–73 (2014); Glendon & Yanes,
supra note 227, at 477–550.
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Little in the final text of the First Amendment or in the debates
surrounding its formation resolves these modern controversies. But
some of the modern controversy turns on how to read the word
“or” that separates the establishment and free exercise language in
the First Amendment. Is this a disjunctive “or” or a conjunctive
“or”? And is the “or” directed at “Congress” or at the “no law”
part of the phrase: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” And then, what does the comma between “religion” and
“or” signify?
Two interpretations are equally plausible under this close
linguistic parsing. If it is read as a disjunctive “or” then the
emphasis is on two separate guarantees: Congress shall make no
law that establishes religion, and Congress shall make no law that
prohibits religion. It is two separate clauses guaranteeing religious
liberty with the “or” modifying “Congress” and with the comma
dividing what Congress may not do. If it is read as a conjunctive
“or” then the emphasis is on the single guarantee that Congress
may not make laws on (or “touching”) religion. These laws may not
establish religion or prohibit its exercise, and a fortiori everything in
between. It is one clause guaranteeing religious liberty, with the
“or” modifying the “law” that Congress is not empowered to make
and the comma separating the two extreme kinds of laws that
are forbidden.229
This might appear like hopelessly casuistic hairsplitting. But
these are common questions for modern textual interpretation in
the law, and both judges and jurists sometimes employ this heavy
hermeneutical machinery on the First Amendment. The original
text and the First Congressional debates and subsequent state
ratification debates about this text do not dispose of
these questions.
5. “Prohibiting the free exercise thereof”
Although the origins of the establishment clause have long
occupied commentators, the origins of the free exercise clause have
only recently come into prominent discussion. As with the
establishment clause, the historical record regarding the free
exercise clause does not resolve all modern questions. Indeed, in

229. See further parsing of “or” and “respecting” in Esbeck, supra note 228, at 232–42.
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the case of the free exercise clause, the congressional record seems
to raise as many questions as it answers.
First, as we noted in the “thinner” reading above, the free
exercise clause merely outlaws congressional acts that “prohibit”
the free exercise of religion. Earlier drafts had included much more
robust protections for free exercise by disallowing laws that would
“touch,” “infringe,” “abridge,” “violate,” “compel,” or “prevent”
the same (Nos. 2, 6, 11–13, 15–18, 20–23). All these suggestions were
replaced by the seemingly minimalist guarantee that Congress not
“prohibit” the free exercise of religion.
Second, the free exercise clause is not matched by an explicit
liberty of conscience clause. Twenty drafts of the religion clauses
had included a provision protecting the liberty or rights of
conscience—sometimes generally, and sometimes in protecting
religious scruples against bearing arms (or swearing oaths). The
final recorded House debates on August 20 show agreement on
both such protections: “Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience” (No. 18; emphasis added). And again, “no
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in
person” (No. 19; emphasis added). The Senate included a guarantee
to avoid infringing the rights of conscience in its first three drafts
but then abruptly and permanently dropped any reference to rights
of conscience at the end of September 3 (No. 24). That leaves the
final, spare free exercise clause.
Third, while it was creating the religious freedom clauses,
Congress was simultaneously formulating and debating the free
speech, free press, and free assembly clauses. The House had
combined the speech, press, and religion clauses already on July 28
(Nos. 15, 17). The Senate combined these with the assembly clause
on September 9 (No. 25), and thereafter they were all considered
together. The House debates on these other First Amendment
provisions make rather clear that religious speech, religious press,
and religious assembly were included in the guarantees of these
three clauses.230 Surely the free exercise clause was not intended to
be merely redundant of these attendant clauses. But that leaves
open the question: What independent content is protected by the
free exercise clause beyond free religious speech, free religious
press, and free religious assembly?
230. THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 5:111–208.
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Too minimal a reading of the free exercise clause is hard to
square with the widespread solicitude for rights of conscience and
free exercise reflected in the First Congress’s debates. Every one of
the ten state drafts of the religion clauses included such protections.
For example, the Virginia and North Carolina drafts, as we saw,
went on at length:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion
according to the dictates of conscience (No. 8).

New York’s draft was also effusive: “That the people have an equal,
natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their
religion, according to the dictates of conscience” (No. 9).
The August House debates that have survived echo a hearty
support for the rights of conscience and free exercise. As we saw,
Daniel Carroll spoke eloquently that “the rights of conscience are,
in their nature of such peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the
gentlest touch of government.”231 Benjamin Huntington warned
against anything “hurtful to religion” and hoped the “amendment
would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience
and a free exercise of the right of religion.”232 Elias Boudinot gave
the final resounding word of the House on August 20: “I hope that
in establishing this Government, we may show the world that
proper care is taken that the Government may not interfere with
the religious sentiments of any person.”233
How does this enthusiasm for the rights of conscience and
freedom of exercise from the states and First Congress square with
what seems like a textually meager guarantee that “Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion?
One response is that the free exercise clause is somewhat less
meager when read in eighteenth-century terms, rather than ours.
The word “prohibiting,” in eighteenth-century parlance, was as
much a synonym as a substitute for the terms “infringing,”
“restraining,” or “abridging” used in earlier drafts.234 As Michael
McConnell has shown, both dictionaries and political tracts of the
231.
232.
233.
234.
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day conflated these terms. To flip from one to the other, particularly
in the charged political rhetoric of the First Congress, could easily
have been driven more by aesthetics and taste than by substantive
calculation.235 One can see this conflation of terms in the original
draft submitted by the Virginia ratification convention in the
summer of 1788. In the preface to its proffered amendments, the
Virginia convention cited its main concern—that “essential rights,
the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be cancelled,
abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority . . . .”236
Commenting on this passage in 1800, Madison argued that the
point of listing all these verbs was simply to underscore “that the
liberty of conscience and the freedom of press were equally and
completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United
States.”237 Such rights, in Madison’s view, were equally and
completely protected by the First Amendment, despite its use of the
alternative terms, “prohibiting” (free exercise) and “abridging”
(free speech, press, etc.). To read the First Amendment otherwise
would lead to silly results:
[I]f Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided
they do not abridge it, because it is said only “they shall not
abridge it,” and is not said, “they shall make no law respecting it,”
the analogy of reasoning is conclusive that Congress may regulate
and even abridge the free exercise of religion, provided they do
not prohibit it; because it is said only “they shall not prohibit it,”
and is not said “they shall make no law respecting, or no law
abridging it.”238

One cannot lean too heavily on this construction since the primary
meaning of “prohibit” in the eighteenth century was still to
“forbid,” “prevent,” or “preclude.” But awareness of the elasticity
of the term in the day and of the inexactitude of the congressional
record, helps to explain the understanding(s) of the First Congress.
Moreover, the phrase “free exercise” itself, in eighteenthcentury parlance, was both a source and a summary of a whole
range of principles of religious freedom. “Free exercise” did have a

235. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1486–88 (1990).
236. ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 1:360 (emphasis added).
237. Report on the Virginia Resolutions (January, 1800), in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 5:141, 146–47.
238. Id.
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distinct meaning in the eighteenth century, as we saw.239 It was
conventionally understood to protect the religious speech, press,
assembly, and other activities of individuals, and the actions
respecting the discipline, clergy, property, and polity of religious
groups.240 But, as we also saw, “free exercise” was just as much an
umbrella term that connoted protections of liberty of conscience,
religious equality and pluralism, and (in some formulations)
separation of church and state. In earlier drafts of the religion
clauses, Congress sought to spell out these various principles
separately—listing liberty of conscience twenty times, religious
equality ten times, and religious pluralism six times. Perhaps in an
attempt to avoid giving priority to any particular construction,
Congress thought it best to use the generic term “free exercise” and
leave its specific content open to ongoing constitutional
development and application. This is a speculative reading, but
certainly a plausible one even on the thin congressional record.
The record of the First Congress does give a better indication of
why a specific clause on conscientious objection to bearing arms
might have been excluded from the First Amendment. The
Continental Congress had included such a provision in its
legislation, as we saw,241 and several state constitutions and
legislatures did so as well.242 The Maryland and North Carolina
ratification conventions had advocated that such a provision be
included in a federal bill of rights (Nos. 3 and 10). The House
committee of eleven had repeated it on July 28 (No. 14). The House
debated the conscientious objection clause on August 17 and 20. It
was clearly controversial—passing only 24–22 in the full House on
August 20 before being silently dropped by the House style
committee four days later.243 House Representatives Gerry and
239. See supra text accompanying notes 23-40.
240. The Congressional Record of 1790 includes an instructive anecdote illustrating the
Congress’s presumption of the free exercise rights of the church and clergy. Medieval canon
law had granted to clergy “privilege of forum” or “benefit of clergy”—the right of an
ordained cleric to have any criminal case against him heard in a church court, rather than in
a civil court. This practice continued after the Reformation, in Catholic and in many
Protestant polities alike, and was a familiar feature of American colonial law. See BURN, supra
note 179, at 1:185–92; GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA AND RELATED
MATTERS (1955). In an act of 1790, Congress provided: “That the benefit of clergy shall not be
used or allowed, upon conviction of any crime, for which, by any statute of the United States,
the punishment is, or shall be declared to be, death.” STOKES, supra note 30, at 1:492.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 101–02.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 148, 156.
243. See supra text accompanying note 165.
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Scott both objected because such an open-ended clause might well
be abused, with the military and the nation thereby imperiled.244
Representatives Scott and Jackson thought it unfair that “one part”
of the nation “would have to defend the other in case of
invasion.”245 Chairman Boudinot ultimately carried the slender
majority at that time with an impassioned speech: “[W]hat justice
can there be in compelling them to bear arms, when, according to
their religious principles, they would rather die than use them?”246
The clause itself quietly disappeared after August 20,
however—and this may be linked to the suggestions by three of the
representatives that conscientious objection was better left to the
legislature. Sherman hinted at this by saying the clause was not
“altogether unnecessary.”247 Scott said more explicitly that
conscientious objection status was not a constitutional but a
“legislative right.”248 Benson elaborated this view, advising that
such questions be left “to the benevolence of the Legislature” and
to the “discretion of the Government.”249 “If this stands part of the
constitution,” Benson reasoned, “it will be a question before the
Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the
organization of the militia[.]”250 Ever since, the contentious issue of
conscientious objection status in the military has remained almost
consistently sub-constitutional—handled by statute and regulation
rather than by direct free exercise inquiry.251
Conscientious objection to military service was only one
application of the broader principle of liberty of conscience,
however. Another was the conscientious objection to oath swearing
that was included in the Maryland and Virginia draft proposals
(Nos. 5, 7). This concern received no attention in the surviving
Congressional debates on the First Amendment. Perhaps the
founders thought conscience claims concerning oaths were better
left to Article VI of the Constitution, which explicitly outlawed
religious test oaths for religious office.252 Or perhaps they thought

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:796–97.
Id. at 1:778–80.
Id. at 1:796.
Id. at 1:757–59.
Id. at 1:796.
Id. at 1:778–80.
Id.
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 129–32.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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this so obvious an application of liberty of conscience embedded
within the notion of free exercise that it warranted no specific
additional text of its own. These, too, are plausible readings but
nothing in the surviving record confirms that this was their intent.
Even if these two specific concerns about liberty of
conscience—military
service
and
oath-swearing—were
addressed, that still leaves unexplained why the First Amendment
seems to leave other dimensions of liberty of conscience
unprotected. Sixteen drafts of the religion clauses, after all, sought
to protect rights or freedom of conscience in general terms. These
drafts reflected the common views of the founders, including
earlier state constitutional drafters, that all religious parties,
particularly religious minorities, needed protection from state
coercions of conscience and from having to obey laws that required
them to do something or to forgo doing something that conflicted
with a core dictate of conscience.253 It could be that the First
Congress decided to leave all such conscience claims to the
legislature to sort out, as they explicitly had done with the most
contested claims of conscientious objection to military service. But
that solution does not address concerns about the tyranny of the
majority, which Madison had signaled as the primary danger point:
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense
of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.254

So what in the First Amendment protected rights of conscience,
including the right to be free from compliance with majoritarian
laws that ran afoul of core claims of conscience?
One answer lies in the reality that in the eighteenth century the
phrase “free exercise” was synonymous with the phrases “freedom
to exercise,” “freedom to practice,” or “freedom to act out” or act
“on” one’s religion as conscience demanded. The New York
proposed draft, we saw, spelled this out: “[T]he people have an
equal, natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise
their religion, according to the dictates of conscience” (No. 9;
emphasis added). Casting the First Amendment free exercise clause
253. Id. at 41–45; supra text accompanying notes 25–28.
254. James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, (October 17, 1788), in Madison, supra note
24, at 5:272.
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as a right or “freedom to exercise” or “to act” peaceably in
accordance with conscience might well allow one to read a general
right to liberty of conscience in the free exercise clause. Moreover,
it would allow one to read the right to liberty of conscience as the
right to forgo an act per the dictates of conscience even if a general
law might require it.
After all, any lawyer—in the eighteenth century or now—would
understand that freedom to act includes the freedom to forgo an
action. Think of the voluntary act requirement in criminal law:
Parties can be liable if they voluntarily act (say, in shooting
someone), or if they voluntarily fail to act when they have a duty to
act (say, in failing to rescue their spouse who has been shot).255 The
First Amendment “free exercise” clause could be read analogously.
The “freedom to exercise” one’s religion consists of both doing acts
or forgoing acts based on the duties of conscience, all of which the
law must protect and respect so far as possible so long as they are
peaceable.” When government intrudes on a party’s freedom to
make a conscientious choice to act or to forgo an action, that prima
facie triggers a First Amendment free exercise claim.
This, too, is a speculative reading about the original meaning of
the free exercise clause, but it might help explain why an explicit
liberty of conscience clause, which includes the right to religious
exemptions from compliance with general laws that violate
conscience, was left out of the First Amendment. Religious exercise
and religious exemption are both an inherent part of the freedom
to exercise religion, this reading concludes, and Congress is
prohibited from impeding that freedom.
Each of these originalist readings of how to protect freedom of
conscience claims under the free exercise clause has ample
champions today. Each can find traction in the founders’
discussions and drafts of the First Amendment, although these
readings would be considerably easier to press had Congress
retained an express freedom of conscience clause. A further
originalist argument for freedom of conscience can be built on
Article VI’s prohibition on religious test oaths as some

255. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, at 6.1–6.2 (6th ed. 2017).
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commentators have argued.256 But this clause has attracted little
Supreme Court case law, the last case being in 1946.257
6. “Of religion”
The word “religion” explicitly modifies the establishment
clause and implicitly modifies the free exercise clause. Nowhere is
the word “religion” defined in the Constitution or Bill of Rights,
and if we strictly observed original intent, much of what constitutes
religion in the twenty-first century would be excluded from First
Amendment protection. In the eighteenth century, the founders
recognized and celebrated a plurality of Protestant Christian faiths.
When pressed as to how much further to extend recognized
religion and its attendant constitutional protection, there was
minor disagreement. Some set the legal line at Protestantism, others
at Christianity in general (thereby including Catholics and Eastern
Orthodox), and still others at theism (thereby including Jews,
Muslims, and Deists).258 But no founders writing on religious rights
and liberties argued seriously about extending constitutional
protection to others by setting the line to include the non-Western
religious traditions practiced by, for example, African slaves or
Native American tribes—let alone non-theistic traditions
like Buddhism.259
The First Congress did little more than repeat this conventional
understanding of the term “religion,” offering no definition of
religion. While the House debates repeated the general
endorsement of a plurality of sects, societies, and denominations,

256. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1986); Daniel L.
Dreisbach, The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious
Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & STATE 261 (1996).
257. The most recent case on point is Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946)
(holding that government may not require a party who conscientiously opposed to swear a
military test oath before receiving naturalized citizenship status, per the free exercise clause
and Article VI prohibiting religious tests). See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 22, at 129–32.
258. See Hutson, supra note 90; FAITH AND THE FOUNDERS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2014) [hereinafter FAITH AND THE FOUNDERS];
THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE (Daniel L. Dreisbach, Jeffry H.
Morrison & Mark David Hall eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS]; GREAT
CHRISTIAN JURISTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2019)
[hereinafter GREAT CHRISTIAN JURISTS].
259. See Hutson, supra note 90; FAITH AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 90; THE
FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS, supra note 90; GREAT CHRISTIAN JURISTS, supra note 90.
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they touched by name only Quakers and Moravians.260 They did
allude to a distinction between religion and nonreligion, as they
sought to reserve the protections of constitutional religious rights
to the former only. In the House debates, Sylvester expressed
concern about “abolish[ing] religion altogether” by crafting too
broad a disestablishment clause.261 Huntington wished “to secure
the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion,
but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all.”262 Scott
wanted to prevent misuse of the conscientious objection clause by
“those who are of no religion.”263 But the congressional record
offers few clues about what counted as religion, and where to draw
the line between religion and non-religion.
CONCLUSION
The eighteenth-century American founders knew they were
creating something new in their new constitutions. James Madison
tells us what the founders commonly understood:
In most of the governments of the old world, the legal
establishment of a particular religion and without any, or with
very little toleration of others, makes a pa[c]t of the political & civil
organization; & there are few of the most enlightened judges who
will maintain that the system has been favourable either to
Religion or to government. Until Holland ventured on the
experiment of combining a liberal toleration, with the
establishment of a particular creed, it was taken for granted that
an exclusive establishment was essential, and notwithstanding
the light thrown on the subject by that experiment, the prevailing
opinion in Europe, England not excepted, has been, that Religion
could not be preserved without the support of Government, nor
Government be supported without an established Religion, that
there must be at least an alliance of some sort between them. It
remained for North America to bring the great & interesting
subject to a fair, & finally, to a decisive test.264

260. ANNALS, supra note 19, at 1:778–80.
261. Id. at 1:757.
262. Id. at 1:758.
263. Id. at 1:796.
264. James Madison, Letter to Rev. Adams (1833), in DANIEL L. DREISBACH, RELIGION
AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPAR ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE 118
(1996) (paragraph breaks omitted). See comparable earlier language by David Hume:
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The “decisive test” for America was to unleash what Thomas
Jefferson called a “fair” and “novel experiment” of guaranteeing
religious freedom to all and granting religious establishments to
none.265 These religious freedom guarantees were set out in many
of the new state constitutions forged between 1776 and 1784 and in
the 1791 First Amendment to the United States Constitution. These
constitutional texts defied the millennium-old assumptions
inherited from Western Europe—that one form of Christianity
must be established in a community and that the state must protect
and support it against all other forms of faith. America would no
longer suffer such governmental prescriptions and proscriptions of
religion. All forms of Christianity had to stand on their own feet
and on an equal footing with all other religions. Their survival and
growth had to turn on the cogency of their word, not the coercion
of the sword, on the faith of their members, not the force of the law.
Theologians and jurists, believers and skeptics, churchmen and
statesman alike all participated in this new constitutional
experiment. Their efforts, while often independent and wideranging, collectively yielded several first principles to guide the new
American experiment—liberty of conscience, free exercise of
religion, religious equality, religious pluralism, separation of church
and state, and disestablishment, at least of a national religion.
These first principles of religious freedom came to their first and
fullest expression in the eleven new state constitutions forged
between 1776 and 1784. No state constitution embraced all six of
these principles equally, and some maintained limits on free
exercise and practices of establishment that would later be found
unconstitutional. But these new state experiments of religious
freedom were important laboratories for the First Amendment,
informing the state ratification debates both about the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. And several of the draft amendments
proposed by the states to the First Congress drew directly on state
constitutional language and experiences.

Before the United Provinces [of the Netherlands] set the example, toleration was
deemed incompatible with good government; and it was thought impossible, that
a number of religious sects could live together in harmony and peace, and have all
of them an equal affection to their common country, and to each other. ENGLAND
has set a like example of civil liberty . . . .
DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 605–06 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985).
265. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 537–39 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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These principles of religious freedom were also incorporated
into the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
singled out religion for special constitutional attention, alongside
protections of free speech, free press, and free assembly. The First
Amendment uniquely targeted “Congress.” This meant that the
First Amendment guarantees of no establishment of religion and
no prohibition on its free exercise were binding only on Congress,
not on state or local legislatures. It further meant that the federal
courts could not hear cases where citizens sought religious freedom
protection against state or local encroachments on them. “The
Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the
respective states in their religious liberties,” the Supreme Court
declared early on: “this is left to the state constitutions and laws.”266
Not only was the First Amendment narrowly focused on
Congress, it also explicitly embraced only two of the six principles
of religious freedom discussed by the founders and incorporated
into the state constitutions. Congress could not establish religion or
prohibit its free exercise. These two principles were considerably
stronger constitutional limits on the national legislature than those
on British and European parliaments in the day that commonly
established one form of Christianity and limited, if not repressed,
all other faiths. Moreover, the founders often treated “nonestablishment” as an umbrella term to protect liberty of conscience,
religious equality, and separation of church and state. And they
equated “free exercise” with liberty of conscience, religious
equality, religious pluralism, and separation of church and state.
Even so, the frugal final sixteen words of the First Amendment
did not make clear what federal laws and governmental actions
short of outright prescribing or proscribing religion were outlawed.
Earlier drafts said Congress was not to “touch” or “favor” religion;
not to give “preference” to any religion or any religious “sect,”
“society,” or “denomination”; not to “establish articles of faith or
mode of worship.” Such provisions were left aside for the more
ambiguous provision that Congress could not make laws
“respecting an establishment of religion.” Adding the word
“respecting” to this guarantee could mean that Congress could
make no laws “concerning” or “regarding” the various state

266. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (1845); see also
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Fifth Amendment in particular, applied only to the national government).
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establishments of religion that still prevailed. Or it could mean that
Congress could make no laws that “reflected” or showed “respect
for” the old Christian establishments in Europe and some of the
American colonies and new states. Or it could mean that Congress
could make no law that “pointed to” or “moved toward” a new
establishment of religion even in piecemeal fashion. All these
understandings fit within eighteenth-century dictionary
definitions of “respecting.”
It was also not clear whether the non-establishment provision
allowed Congress to favor or support religion “generally” or “nonpreferentially” as several earlier drafts had urged. The same First
Congress that drafted the First Amendment followed the
Continental Congress’s practice of funding and supporting
religious education, missionaries, legislative and military
chaplains, presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and
more. And the First Congress also included overt religious
language and strong religious freedom guarantees in its first
treaties, land grants, and territorial ordinances, like the Northwest
Ordinance. The founders evidently did not regard such “nonpreferential support” for religion as an establishment of religion
contrary to the First Amendment.
Likewise, the various drafts of the free exercise of religion
guarantee had included much more sweeping language: Congress
was not to “infringe,” “abridge,” “violate,” “compel,” or “prevent”
the freedom to exercise religion or the rights and freedom of
conscience, or indeed even “touch” religion in a way that might
obstruct, impede, or hinder its free exercise. Again, such provisions
were left aside for the blunter provision: Congress could simply not
“prohibit” the free exercise of religion. This left little textual
guidance on what short of outright prohibition on the freedom to
exercise religion was allowed or outlawed. Importantly, too, the
First Amendment dropped the guarantee of freedom of conscience
in general as well as the specific protections of conscientious
objection to military service which several drafts of the First
Amendment and every state constitution protected. Article V of the
Constitution did ban federal religious test oaths, in part because
they violated freedom of conscience.
Some founders like James Madison argued that the First
Amendment’s explicit words “prohibiting” and “abridging”—as
well as other common words like “preventing,” “limiting,” and
“violating”—were all synonymous limits on Congress, thereby
1376
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allowing for a less literal reading of “prohibiting.” Moreover, other
founders made clear that the First Amendment free speech, press,
and assembly clauses expressly included religious speech, religious
publication, and religious association. That left wide open the
question of what the free exercise clause protected that was not
already guaranteed by the free speech, press, and assembly clauses.
One obvious candidate is the principle of liberty of conscience, with
its express concern for religious voluntarism, freedom from coercion,
and exemptions from laws that violated conscience. But this, too, is
a speculative reading, especially since many of the state constitutions
and earlier drafts of the First Amendment had separate liberty of
conscience and free exercise of religion guarantees.
Neither originalists nor their critics will be fully satisfied with
what this careful text-sifting of the sources of the First Amendment
has yielded. In 2008, at a conference organized by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, I had the privilege to present
the foregoing account at a conference dinner with the most famous
of originalists, Justice Antonin Scalia. He listened with more
patience than I deserved, as I worked through the data and
ventured my speculations on what’s clear and not so clear about
the original understanding of the First Amendment religious
freedom clauses. After a few shrewd and pointed questions, and a
few “hmmm’s,” “interesting’s,” and even one “that’s very
intriguing!” he concluded: “Well, you have now cast reasonable
doubt in my mind. I’ll need to look at the sources again.”
Similarly, in 2012, as part of my duties in the Maguire Chair at
the Kluge Center in the Library of Congress, I had the privilege of
addressing the freshman class just elected to the House of
Representatives. My task was to offer a short precis of the foregoing
historical material and its implications for ongoing religious
freedom protection. The first question after I finished was from a
self-described liberal: “Why don’t you just stick to the First
Amendment text that calls for the separation of church and state?”
“Because that’s not what the text says,” I replied. “Of course, it
does,” came the reply. I handed him my pocket constitution opened
to the First Amendment. He read it several times very slowly,
flipped a few pages back and forth, and then tossed the pocket
constitution back to me, saying: “Well, it should be there!”
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APPENDIX 1
Drafts of Religious Freedom Clauses in United States Bill of
Rights (1787–1789)
Drafts Proposed by the State Ratification Conventions
1.

“The rights of conscience shall be held inviolable; and
neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial powers of
the United States, shall have authority to alter, abrogate,
or infringe any part of the constitutions of the several
states, which provide for the preservation of liberty in
matter of religion.”—Pennsylvania Minority Proposal,
December 15, 1787.267

2.

“[T]hat the said Constitution be never construed to
authorize Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press,
or the rights of conscience[.]”—Massachusetts Minority
Proposal, February 6, 1788.268

3.

“That no persons conscientiously scrupulous of bearing
arms, in any case, shall be compelled personally to serve as
a
soldier.”—Maryland
Minority
Proposal,
April 21, 1788.269

4.

“That there be no national religion established by law; but
that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty.”—Maryland Minority Proposal, April
21, 1788.270

5.

“That all warrants, without oath, or affirmation of a
person conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to
search suspected places, or to seize any person, or his
property, are grievous and oppressive. . ..”—Maryland
Majority Proposal, April 21, 1788.271

267. THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL, supra note 145; PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, supra note 145.
268. Massachusetts Minority Proposal, in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE:
SELECTED READINGS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 415–16 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark A. Hall eds., 2009).
269. Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 1:553.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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6.

“Congress shall make no Laws touching Religion, or to
infringe the rights of Conscience.”—New Hampshire
Proposal, June 21, 1788.272

7.

“All warrants . . . to search suspected places, or seize any
freeman, his papers or property, without information
upon oath (or affirmation of a person religiously
scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause,
are grievous and oppressive . . . and ought not to be
granted.”—Virginia Proposal, June 26, 1788.273

8.

“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our creator,
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and
therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable
right to the free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect
or society ought to be favored or established by law in
preference to others.”—Virginia Proposal, June 26, 1788.274

9.

“That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable
right, freely and peaceably to exercise their religion,
according to the dictates of conscience; and that no
religious sect or society ought to be favored or established
by law in preference to others.”—New York Proposal,
July 26, 1788.275

10. “That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms
ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to
employ another to bear arms in his stead. That religion,
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men
have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free
exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience;
and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established by law in preference to others.”—
North Carolina Proposal, August 1, 1788; Repeated by
Rhode Island, June 16, 1790.276

Drafts Debated in the First Congress (1789)
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 1:326.
Id. at 3:593.
Id. at 1:327; 3:594.
Id. at 1:361.
Id. at 1:331; 4:244.
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11. “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or any pretext,
infringed.”—Draft Proposed to the House by James
Madison, June 8, 1789.277
12. “No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or
the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases.”—Draft Proposed to House by James Madison,
June 8, 1789.278
13. “[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed.”—Draft Proposed
to House by Committee of Eleven, July 28, 1789.279
14. “[N]o person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms.”—Draft Proposed to House by Committee of
Eleven, July 28, 1789.280
15. “[N]o State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience,
nor the freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right
of trial by jury in criminal cases.”—Draft Proposed to
House by Committee of Eleven, July 28, 1789.281
16. “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
infringing the rights of conscience.”—Draft Proposed by
Charles Livermore on August 15, 1789; Passed by
the House.282
17. “[T]he equal rights of conscience, the freedom of speech
or of the press, and the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases, shall not be infringed by any State.”—Draft
Proposed by Charles Livermore on August 17, 1789;
Passed by the House.283
18. “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to
prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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Id. at 1:452.
Id. at 1:757.
Id. at 1:778.
Id. at 1:783.
Id. at 1:759.
Id. at 1:784.
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of conscience.”—Revised Draft Proposed by Fisher Ames
on August 20, 1789; Passed by the House.284
19. “No person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms in person.”—Revised Draft Passed by the
House, August 20, 1789.285
20. “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights
of conscience be infringed.”—Final Draft Proposed by the
Style Committee, Passed by the House, and Sent to the
Senate, August 25, 1789.286
21. “Congress shall make no law establishing One Religious
Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the rights
of conscience be infringed.”—Draft Proposed and
Defeated in the Senate, September 3, 1789.287
22. “Congress shall not make any law, infringing the rights
of conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or
Society.”—Draft Proposed and Defeated in the Senate,
September 3, 1789.288
23. “Congress shall make no law establishing any particular
denomination of religion in preference to another, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights
of conscience be infringed.”—Draft Proposed and
Defeated in the Senate, September 3, 1789.289
24. “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”—Draft Proposed
and Passed by the Senate, September 3, 1789.290
25. “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith
or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of
religion . . . .”—Draft Proposed and Passed by the Senate,
and Sent to the House, September 9, 1789.291

284. Id. at 1:796.
285. Id.
286. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 159, 166 (Linda DePauw et al. eds., 1972).
287. Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 69, at 1:116.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1:117.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1:129.
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26. “Congress shall make no Law respecting an
establishment of Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”—Draft Proposed by Joint House-Senate
Committee on September 24, 1789, and Passed by House
and Senate on September 25, 1789.292

292. Id. at 1:145, 148, 948.
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